The National Woman's Party (1916-1919) : its story and its images by Leonard, Deborah Lynn & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

LEONARD,  DEBORAH LYNN.     The National Woman's Party   (1916-1919):     Its 
Story and  Its  Images.     (1977)     Directed by:     Dr.  Jane Mathews. 
Pp.  105. 
The purpose of  this study was  to explore the story of  the 
National Woman's Party with regard to its  images during the period 
from 1916 to 1919.     The role of  the Woman's Party was considered in 
the context  of  the  larger women's suffrage movement;   the image of 
the Woman's Party was compared  and contrasted  as  it was presented 
in several media sources;   and   the reactions to   the Woman's Party 
were analyzed   in the context of   contemporary social expectations. 
Historical background  for  the Woman's Party's origins and 
development was assembled chiefly from secondary sources.     The 
Party's   images during the period of  1916-1919 were explored  through 
examination of materials written or compiled by  the National Woman's 
Party and   its members   (including a  limited amount  of research  in the 
National Woman's Party Papers  in  the Manuscript Division of  the 
Library of Congress),   materials written or compiled by the rival 
suffrage group—the National American Woman's Suffrage Association, 
and articles written for and published  in several  contemporary news- 
papers and  periodicals over the period of  time discussed.     The spe- 
cifics considered were  images of  the Woman's Party's  leadership, 
political strategy,   and methods.     A model of a turn-of-the-century 
"ideal woman" was  then considered as a standard for comparison with 
the images of the Woman's Party. 
It was  found  that  the Woman's Party,  a  radical group of militant 
suffragists,   aroused a variety of  reactions.     The  images of  the 
Woman's Party as  presented  in Woman's Party sources were predict- 
ably sympathetic ones.     The  images  presented by NAWSA materials 
and by contemporary periodicals were,  on the whole,  critical and 
even hostile.     These negative  reactions were shown to be  largely 
the product  of a disparity between the expectations of an  "ideal 
woman" and   the choices that  the Woman's Party made in terms of 
rhetoric,   tactics,   and  tools  in their  fight  for a constitutional 
amendment   for women's suffrage. 
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CHAPTER   I 
INTRODUCTION:     THE  PROBLEM OF  IMAGES 
In 1920 the Nineteenth Amendment,  granting American women 
the right   to vote, was ratified and   thus became a part of  the United 
States Constitution.     Women's active struggle for suffrage in America 
had   lasted more than half a century,   had extended  over several  gen- 
erations,   and had included sometimes  unified,   sometimes divergent 
political  ideologies and   tactics.     Any movement of such  longevity 
that   focuses on such a controversial   issue is   likely to have within 
it disagreement  and even conflict  over goals and methods.     The 
women's suffrage movement was no exception and,   in fact,   endured 
at least  two significant  splits within  its ranks before the suffrage 
amendment was  finally passed.     The National Woman's Party was the 
product of  the latter of  these splits and,   in the final decade of 
the suffrage fight,  added a militant voice to  the already heated 
debate over women's suffrage. 
There were several aspects of   the  program of  the National 
Woman's Party that made this group a unique one in the American 
women's  suffrage struggle.     The primary emphasis  that most distin- 
guished  the National Woman's Party from the larger National American 
Woman's Suffrage Association was   the commitment of the former  to 
working solely for  the passage of  a  federal amendment   to the United 
States Constitution and  ignoring  the route  of trying to win the vote 
in individual states  through state referenda or state  legislative 
actions.     The NAWSA,   on the other hand,   fought  the battle on both 
fronts.     A second  strategy that was unique to  the Woman's Party 
was  the policy of holding the political party in power responsible 
for the status of women's suffrage legislation.    This resulted in 
Woman's Party campaigns against Democrats  as a  group in the elections 
of  1916 and  1918,   even though many  individual Democrats had sup- 
ported the women's suffrage amendment   through votes and active cam- 
paigning.     This   tactic of holding the party in power responsible was 
especially aimed at  the states where women already had the vote. 
In these states,   the Woman's  Party attempted  to organize women 
voters to defeat all Democratic candidates.    Carrie Chapman Catt 
of  the NAWSA claimed  that  through this strategy  the Woman's Party 
"defeated none," but  rather  "aroused  the irritation of all."1    Even 
this abrasive stance was not  the most  radical of  the National Woman's 
Party's activities.     A third  factor that assured  the notoriety of  the 
Woman's Party as  a unique sub-group within the women's  suffrage move- 
ment was its use of militant   tactics.     It was members of  the National 
Woman's Party who picketed  the White House as a means  to keep the suf- 
frage issue before  the eyes of   the President and  the public.     It was 
Woman's Party members who burned President Woodrow Wilson in effigy 
and burned copies of his speeches on democracy when he failed  to put 
the power of his administration behind  the suffrage amendment.    And 
it was Woman's Party members who,  when arrested and jailed for  their 
activities, went on hunger strikes that provoked public  indignation 
and outrage toward prison and governmental officials. 
Not surprisingly,   therefore,   the National Woman's Party and 
its  leader,  Alice Paul,   received  from the contemporary press and 
continues  to receive  from historians more attention for its mili- 
tant  tactics  than for  the  issues  to which  the Woman's Party was so 
committed.     Eleanor Flexner's assessment defines   the dilemma: 
In evaluating its  contribution to the winning of woman suffrage, 
attention has  too often been concentrated on the phase of   .   .   . 
activity which began in  1917,  when Alice Paul's organization 
went over  to "militant"   tactics.   .   .   .     But to do so is to over- 
look the long stretch of work,  beginning in 1913,  during part of 
which  they were the only effective group working for a constitu- 
tional woman suffrage amendment.     They  took up that   issue when 
it seemed dead and brought it very much to life.2 
This analysis by Flexner  is  indicative of a  "problem" faced by the 
National Woman's Party—the problem of  the group's public image as 
wild and radical militants.     The Woman's Party was,   in fact,  a mili- 
tant  group,  but   the negative  connotations of militancy tend to be the 
dominant  themes   in much of what has been written about  the group by 
those who were outside of  the Woman's Party.     Those who were members 
of the Woman's Party most  often tell of  their militant  tactics  in 
terms of brave and heroic deeds.    The disparity between these  two 
presentations creates a need  for a definitive and unbiased account 
of the activities of  the National Woman's Party. 
This need  for an objective and  thorough account has not been 
met,   for there has not been a major  "history" specifically about   the 
National Woman's Party written by a scholar who was not personally 
involved with the group during  its years of activity.    Thus,   the 
material on  the Woman's Party,   with  the exception of one doctoral dis- 
sertation,   is rather quickly "sorted"  into three categories:     (1) 
those materials written or compiled by the National Woman's  Party 
and  its members,   (2)   those materials written and  compiled by other 
suffragists,   especially those of  the rival National American Woman's 
Suffrage Association,   and   (3)   those articles written for and published 
in contemporary newspapers and  periodicals.     To try to gather "truth" 
from materials  in any one of these categories   is  a perplexing process. 
Anne F.   and Andrew M.   Scott comment on this  in a bibliographic essay: 
For the  twentieth-century movement   there  is a bias  in all  the 
firsthand accounts   insofar as neither wing gives proper credit 
to the other.     Thus  Irwin and Stephens   [Woman's Party activists] 
write as  if  the NAWSA did not exist,  while Maud Wood Park   [NAWSA 
historian]   .   .   .  has only harsh  things  to  say about  the  influence 
of  the Congressional Union and  the Woman's  Party.   .   .   .  Loretta 
Zimmermann's "Alice Paul and  the National Woman's Party," dis- 
sertation,   Tulane University,   1964  is the work of a careful 
scholar,  but she,   too,   is a prisoner of her sources and under- 
estimates  the work of   the NAWSA.3 
To examine several  important   issues that are a part of  the 
National Woman's Party's  story as   they were presented  in the three 
sources  referred  to   is a  fascinating exercise  that helps  to achieve 
the "whole"  picture  that  the historian seeks.     Recognition of  the bias 
in these materials and an  interpretive      reading of such materials  is 
an enlightening—though prolonged—way of  getting beyond  the  images 
to the reality of   the historical  issues.     In an  introduction to his 
own study of another  subject,  Martin Duberman reflects on the prob- 
lem of presenting "reality"  in the process  of history-writing:     "Every 
historian knows  that he manipulates  the evidence to some extent be- 
cause of who he is   (or  is not),   of what he selects  (or omits),   of 
how well   (or badly)   he empathizes and communicates."^    This study will 
strive to recognize,   interpret,  and,   to some extent,   explain this 
bias that Duberman has  Identified.    A unique bias exists for each 
of the categories  referred  to and  each of  these categories creates 
a unique kind of   "publicity"  for  the National Woman's Party.     The 
power of publicity and   the biased   images  that   it creates is sug- 
gested by an  intriguing comment  on suffrage from the December 2, 
1916 issue of   the  New Republic:     "Many of my friends have told me 
that  they were first converted to women's  suffrage by the anti- 
suffragist editorials of  the New York Times.""    Thus,   images created 
by the media can  indeed by powerful and sometimes unpredictable. 
To look at  the variation in  images of the National Woman's 
Party created by Woman's Party publications,  by NAWSA publications, 
and by contemporary  publications yields some unique insights that 
are preparatory to addressing a deeper question:     Why did  the Woman's 
Party provoke the reactions—sometimes vehement  reactions—that   it 
did?    This question will  require both an exploration of  the Woman's 
Party and  its  images and  an exploration of  turn-of-the-century Ameri- 
can society and   the  expectations that  it imposed  for "proper"  females. 
Thus,   it  is necessary to  look at  the Woman's Party not only as a sig- 
nificant activist group but also to explore the reactions to the group 
in the context of contemporary social  expectations. 
To address  these questions successfully,   it  is  important  first 
to recount  the chain of events that make the story of  the National 
Woman's Party.     The contributions made by the Woman's Party can then 
emerge from interpretive reading of  the sources  that present and in 
fact shaped the images of  the Woman's Party.     The attention to the 
media coverage will focus primarily on  the images not related to the 
Party's picketing activities,   for that aspect of  the National Woman's 
Party has already received much attention.     The time period  focused 
on begins with  the formal organization of  the Woman's Party after 
its break with the NAWSA and  ends with the passage of  the Nineteenth 
Amendment by the United States Congress.     But just as  its  influence 
has extended beyond  1919,   the National Woman's Party can claim roots 
of  its beginning well before  1916. 
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CHAPTER  II 
THE  FOUNDATION  IS  LAID 
The Early Movement 
American women first  formally called  for  the right to vote   in 
the Declaration of   Sentiments  issued at  the Seneca Falls   (New York) 
Convention of   1848.     This meeting  that gave birth to the women's 
rights movement   in America was made up of women such as Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott,  who had been involved  in the major 
reform movements of  the  time,   the anti-slavery movement and the tem- 
perance movement.1     It was primarily from women's active involvement 
in the abolition movement  of  the 1830's and   the 1840's  that  this  ten- 
tative women's  rights movement drew its   inspiration and its  leadership. 
These women began to address  the issues  of  the new movement  for 
women's rights   in the years before and during the Civil War,  but   they 
continued  to work diligently for  the abolition of  slavery.     Their work 
was rewarded at  the conclusion of  the Civil War by the abolition of 
slavery,  but   their own rights as women were ironically restricted by 
the process of securing civil rights  for  the black man.     When the 
Fifteenth Amendment  defined the right  to vote for all men  (including, 
of course,  blacks),   these activist women,  who had  formerly been dis- 
enfranchised by state and  local voting laws,  were now denied  the 
right  to vote by the United  States Constitution!     But  even though 
the experience of  these early feminists  in working for the broadening 
of  suffrage had only created a constitutional barrier to their own 
suffrage,   they had,   in the process,   taken steps toward activism with- 
in the abolition movement  and  thus  gained some  important and valuable 
experience in  the realm of  practical politics.     Sara M.   Evans elabo- 
rates on both the tactical and  the  theoretical  relationships between 
the abolition movement  and  the beginnings of the women's rights move- 
ment : 
Working for racial justice,   they  [women]   gained experience in 
organizing and   in collective action,   an ideology which described 
and condemned oppression analogous to their own,  and a belief in 
human  "rights" which could justify them in claiming equality for 
themselves.2 
In 1866,   the first women's rights convention since the Civil 
War chartered  the American Equal Rights Association,   "organized to 
further the  interests of both Negroes and women."3    Factions developed 
within this organization as soon as  it was formed.     The process of 
ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments then under- 
way created  disagreement among the suffrage ranks.     Susan B. Anthony 
and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,   the radicals of  the early movement, 
worked against ratification of  these amendments because the rights 
that  they granted were exclusively for men,  while more moderate suf- 
fragists,   such as Lucy Stone,  acquiesced to  the argument  that "this 
was the   'Negro's hour'   and  that nothing must be allowed  to   interfere 
with it.'"1 
This   initial disagreement over priorities deepened over the 
next  three years.    Divisiveness was aggravated by such factors as 
the predominantly male leadership's  emphasis on the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,   a defeat  in a Kansas referendum on women's 
suffrage,   and  Congress's pointed refusal to include women in the 
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voting rights provided by the Fifteenth Amendment.     The debate within 
the Association on each of these factors consistently followed  the 
radical-moderate split until 1869, when the American Equal Rights 
Association formally split into two groups:    the National Woman's 
Suffrage Association and  the American Woman's  Suffrage Association. 
The National Woman's Suffrage Association,  centered  in New 
York, was  the more radical of   the two groups and was  led by Susan 
B.  Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,  who felt  that  the male leader- 
ship  in the American Equal Rights Association had betrayed  the cause 
of women's suffrage.     The National focused  its attention on the pas- 
sage of a women's suffrage amendment   to  the Constitution while it 
addressed the broad—and sometimes controversial—spectrum of  issues 
concerning women's rights.     The NWSA centered  its activities on Con- 
gress and succeeded in having the women's  suffrage amendment intro- 
duced  in Congress in 1878   (by Senator Aaron Sargent of California), 
in having women's  suffrage committees  created both in the House of 
Representatives   (a temporary committee)  and in the Senate  (a standing 
committee)   in 1882,  and in getting a favorable report  from the Senate 
Committee on the women's suffrage amendment   in 1887.     But  in spite of 
these advances by the NWSA,  when the women's  suffrage bill reached 
the floor of the Senate,   it was defeated by a vote of 34-16. 
The American Woman's  Suffrage Association,  centered  in Boston, 
was generally more conservative than the National.     Led by Lucy Stone 
and Julia Ward Howe,   it  gave verbal support  to the idea of a  federal 
amendment but concentrated  its actual work on efforts  to secure 
women's suffrage through state referenda or legislation.     The more 
* 
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egalitarian western states were  the first  to grant  suffrage  to women, 
probably because in the relatively unstructured society of  the fron- 
tier,  women's equality was more readily accepted and even necessary 
than  in  the conservative,  urban societies of the East.     The AWSA met 
with success when the territory of Wyoming granted women the vote   in 
1869 and  the territory of Utah followed  in 1870   (although Congress 
revoked   this action by Utah in  1887).     Wyoming was admitted  to the 
Union as the first women's suffrage state in 1890.     But this one 
victory had to stand before a string of defeats.     By  1890,  eight 
states had rejected women's suffrage referenda.5 
Both groups,   the NWSA and  the AWSA, were actively working for 
women's suffrage,  but  the radical-moderate dichotomy as  to how the 
goal would best be reached  created  the need for  the two separate 
organizations.     Each group made some progress by its own definitions, 
and,   according to  the Scott's, 
The two organizations,   each following  its own philosophy and 
working within its own capabilities,   reached more women and 
men than either could have done alone.     Stanton and Anthony 
could not have ranged so widely or experimented    so freely 
had they been required  to secure Lucy Stone's approval;  nor 
could  Stone,   had  she remained with  them,  have appealed success- 
fully to the more timid or conservative women whom they fright- 
ened. 6 
But after more  than  twenty years of  independent activity,   neither the 
National nor  the American had met with far-reaching success.     This 
twenty years had  clouded  the issues that had  separated  the two groups 
and resulted  in a duplication of efforts.     Younger women who were new 
supporters of  the suffrage movement were puzzled as  to why there were 
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two national suffrage associations.  Not surprisingly, the leadership 
of the two groups began to discuss re-unification in 1887. 
In February 1890, the two organizations merged into the National 
American Women's Suffrage Association.  Susan B. Anthony of the old 
NWSA became the president, but, in spite of her leadership role, her 
commitment to working for federal legislation was not endorsed.  The 
NAWSA's emphasis, like that of its AWSA predecessor, was on activity 
in the states.  This newly united organization directed the suffrage 
forces as women won the vote in Colorado in 1893 and in Idaho in 1896 
and re-established voting rights for women in Utah in 1896.  These 
victories were directed by a new leader in the suffrage ranks, Carrie 
Chapman Catt, whose efforts to build a well organized structure and 
strategy for the NAWSA and impressive performance made her the choice 
as President of NAWSA when Susan B. Anthony stepped down in 1900. 
In spite of the promise of new and assertive leadership in 
the NAWSA, the period between 1896 and 1910 has been labeled the 
"doldrums" for women's suffrage.  All six of the state referenda held 
during this period were lost and the fight for a federal amendment had 
virtually ceased.7  The old leaders, who had provided an imperative 
raison d'etre for the movement through vigorous pursuit of their goals, 
were passing on:  Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucy Stone died in 1902; 
Susan B. Anthony, in 1906.  The problem of leadership became acute 
when Carrie Chapman Catt resigned as president in 1904 and Dr. Anna 
Howard Shaw took over.  Dr. Shaw was an impressive orator but a lack- 
luster leader and organizer.  Anti-suffrage groups, on the other hand, 
grew in strength during this period. 
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But despite apparent decline,   this  "doldrums" period was 
actually a time of  significant   internal and attitudinal development 
for both the women's suffrage movement and for the American social 
and political  structure.    The decline of  the birthrate,   the growing 
number of college  educated women,   the growing number of women join- 
ing the work world,   and  the emergence of a group of  impressive women 
reformers such as Jane Addams and  Florence Kelley,   coinciding with 
the emergence of the progressive movement  served  to bring the issue 
of women's suffrage back to the forefront  in  the early years of  the 
twentieth century.8    The development of  the progressive movement 
was particularly important because  it had brought a new zeal for re- 
form to national politics.    The suffragists put new emphasis on their 
call  for the vote for women as a way to  "clean up" government and, 
according to William H.   Chafe,   they succeeded  in putting women's 
suffrage back on the public agenda.     The suffragists were willing to 
"trade off"  their support   for most  reform legislation in return for 
support  from the progressives  for the suffrage struggle.9    Thus,   the 
interaction of  the political phenomenon of progressivism with the 
social forces that were creating a "new" American woman created under- 
currents during  this period of "doldrums"  that made for a growing 
and vigorous women's suffrage movement as  it entered  the decade of 
the 1910's. 
The event which marked the end of the "doldrums" period, the 
first women's suffrage parade, was held in New York in 1910 under 
the direction of Harriott Stanton Blatch, daughter of Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton. Blatch had returned to this country in 1908 after spending 
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time with the English suffragettes under the highly organized and 
militant  leadership  of Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst.     She 
organized  the Women's Political Union in New York,   seeking support 
from a new group—the working women in urban areas—and using the 
activist and even aggressive  tactics that she had  learned in 
England.1°    This new approach certainly brought publicity to  the 
cause,   and,   after the initial  shock,   suffragists generally judged 
the parades to be a very successful form of agitation.11 
Some tangible advances  for women's suffrage began to emerge. 
In 1910,   the state of Washington gave women the vote,   followed by 
California in 1911 and by Oregon,  Arizona,  and Kansas in 1912.     In 
the early part of 1913,  the  territory of Alaska  gave women  the vote 
and  Illinois gave women the right  to vote in municipal and presiden- 
tial elections.     The movement had received some measure of political 
validation in 1912, when the Progressive Party included a call for 
women's  suffrage  in the party platform.     With this sign of  political 
legitimacy,  morale within the movement rose and,   in spite of Dr. 
Shaw's weakness as a leader,   the NAWSA seemed  to be making progress 
as  it continued  to focus  its attention on activities  in the individual 
states. 
Meanwhile,   the machinery  to work on the Constitutional amend- 
ment was  in existence,  but it was weak.     There was a Congressional 
Committee within the NAWSA that was to keep the  issue of women's  suf- 
frage before Congress,  but  it was,   for the most part,   inactive.     By 
1910,   neither  the committee in the Senate nor the committee  in the 
House of Representatives had reported favorably on the women's suffrage 
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amendment since 1893,   and  the amendment had never even reached the 
floor of  the House of Representatives  for a vote. 12    The woeful in- 
adequacy of  the activities of  the NAWSA's Congressional Committee is 
illustrated by the fact   that when,   in 1912, Mrs.  William Kent,   chair- 
man of the Congressional Committee,   received ten dollars for expenses 
connected with congressional hearings on the amendment,   she returned 
change to the NAWSA at  the end of  the yearjl3    This inactivity concern- 
ing the federal  amendment would shortly be dispelled by the emergence 
of two new personalities.     In 1912,  Alice Paul and Lucy Burns offered 
their services  to Dr.  Anna Howard  Shaw to work for the NAWSA in se- 
curing the passage of  the federal amendment   for women's suffrage. 
Their impact was  to be an   important one. 
Prelude:     The Congressional Union 
Alice Paul and Lucy Burns had both been in England and par- 
ticipated  in the British suffrage movement  in the early years of 
the twentieth century.     Alice Paul,  who was to emerge as  the leader 
of the militant American suffragists,  had served a prison sentence 
for her suffrage activities  in England before she returned to the 
United States   in  1910  to complete her Ph.D.  at   the University of 
Pennsylvania.     Transferring her organizing activities to her native 
land,   this intense Quaker woman renewed her acquaintance with Burns 
who was also interested in applying  the tactics  learned in England 
to achieve a federal women's  suffrage amendment.     In 1912, when the 
two offered  their services to the NAWSA,  Dr.   Shaw and Jane Addams. 
vice-president of the NAWSA,   were so impressed that   they appointed 
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Alice Paul to  chair the NAWSA's Congressional Committee with the under- 
standing that  she would be responsible for raising the necessary funds 
for the Committee's activities.    Delighted by this opportunity,   Paul 
arrived  in Washington,  D.   C.   in early 1913 where she appointed Lucy 
Burns,   Crystal Eastman, Mary Ritter Beard,   and Mrs.   Lawrence Lewis 
as members of her committee.^ 
The first major activity that   the new Congressional Committee 
organized was a suffragist  parade held  in Washington,  D.  C.   on March 3, 
1913—the day before President Woodrow Wilson's  inauguration.     The 
purpose of  the parade was  to draw the attention of  the visitors from 
all over the country who would be in  the city for the inauguration to 
the suffrage  issue and   to show them that  the women's  suffrage movement 
was a national movement   that  cut across class lines.     The parade in- 
cluded  "women farmers   ...   in sunbonnets,  university graduates   in 
cap and gown,  Mrs.   Catt's Woman Suffrage Party in white with gay yellow 
sashes."15    Over 5,000 women marched,   and  the parade drew such a  large 
crowd of spectators  that   it was reported  that  President-elect Wilson, 
upon arriving  in the capital,   asked,   "Where are all the people?"16 
The parade was an unqualified success primarily because  the 
marchers met  a disorderly mob of spectators.     Although the women had 
a parade permit  and  began the parade in an orderly manner,   the marchers 
did not  receive the  police protection that  their parade permit  should 
have insured.     The scene turned   into a near riot.    Harriott Stanton 
Blatch reported  that  "some marchers were struck in the face by on- 
lookers,   spat  upon,   and overwhelmed with ribald remarks,   and  the 
police officers did nothing  to check the onslaught."17    The Secretary 
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of War had to  call  In troops  to restore order,  and  sympathy that was 
aroused  for the suffragist marchers was much greater than any reac- 
tion to an orderly march would have been.     Public opinion was so sym- 
pathetic  to the  suffragists that an  investigation was demanded  that 
resulted in the District of Columbia chief of police losing his job. 
Indeed,   it was a striking commentary on the injustices suffered by 
women that  these women were  thus abused  in the city  that was directly 
governed by the United  States Congress.*" 
Alice Paul was so encouraged by the publicity that  the suf- 
fragists gained  from the Washington march and  the praise that she, 
as  its  organizer,   received  that  she decided  to branch out  from her 
activities within  the NAWSA.     While keeping her post  as chairman of 
the NAWSA's Congressional Committee,   Paul,   in April 1913,   set up, 
with Dr.   Shaw's blessing,   the new Congressional Union as an affiliate 
of  the NAWSA.    The sole purpose of  the Congressional Union was to work 
for  the passage of   the federal women's suffrage amendment. 
The nature of  the relationship between the Congressional Com- 
mittee and  the Congressional Union was vague from the beginning and, 
by the time of  the NAWSA's annual convention  in December  1913,   the 
official minutes of  the convention noted that: 
The program of work and disbursements of  the Committee of the 
National had been so interwoven with the work and disbursements 
of  the new organization that the joint chairman of both   [Alice 
Paul]   declared   that   it was impossible to separate them.19 
There were further  problems,   for the Congressional Union advocated 
strategies and  tactics  that were at  odds with NAWSA policy.     Alice 
Paul and  the Congressional Union said that  suffrage activity should 
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be limited  to pressure on the President and  the Congress for passage 
of  the federal amendment and that   the Democratic  party should be 
held responsible for the fact  that no action had been taken on women's 
suffrage.    The NAWSA had  extensive operations at work on the state 
level and adamantly rejected the "party  in power" argument,   holding 
the view that   it would require support from both parties to reach a 
two-thirds majority  in both houses of Congress.20 
Against  this backdrop of a developing rift with  its mother 
organization,   the Congressional Union  in November of  1913 began pub- 
lishing its own newspaper,  The Suffragist,   which was  in direct  com- 
petition with  the NAWSA's Woman's Journal.     This heightened  the con- 
cern of  the NAWSA board about  the Congressional Union,   and when the 
NAWSA gathered  in Washington in December 1913 for its annual conven- 
tion,   the delegates heard  the report   of the Congressional Committee 
with what Carrie Chapman Catt called "mingled feelings of satisfaction 
at  the lively campaign that had been steadily conducted and surprise 
over certain facts recorded."21    The "lively campaign"  included hear- 
ings before the House Rules Committee,   parades,   deputations sent  to 
the President,   a favorable report  on the federal amendment  gained 
from the Women's  Suffrage Committee of  the Senate,  and  consideration 
gained of  establishing a standing Women's Suffrage Committee in the 
House.     The "surprise" refers to Catt's  rather pointed  questions on 
the floor of the convention as to  the relationship between the Con- 
gressional Committee and  the Congressional Union.     Concern was suf- 
ficient  to warrant   instructions to the National Board of  the NAWSA 
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to decide on appropriate action concerning the Congressional Committee 
and the Congressional Union.     Accordingly,   the NAWSA Board met and 
concluded that  the Congressional Committee and  the Congressional 
Union must be completely separate,   that  the leadership must be shared, 
and that  the Congressional Union must report  regularly to the National 
Board on its activities.22    Alice Paul refused  these conditions and 
the National Board removed her as  the head of  the Congressional Com- 
mittee.     In February of 1914,   the Congressional Union asked  that  its 
status within the NAWSA be changed  from "affiliate" to "auxiliary" 
because the fee was  smaller.     The Board voted against  this proposal 
and,   from that point on,   there were  two committees,   the Congressional 
Committee of  the NAWSA and the Congressional Union,   both working for 
essentially the same goals but with no sustained co-operation.23 
This break gave the Congressional Union freedom to develop 
its unique program in the same way that  the NWSA-AWSA split had given 
Anthony and Stanton freedom to develop their more radical style and 
program in the nineteenth century.    Autonomy also brought  a heavy 
financial contributor to the Congressional Union,  Mrs.   0.   H.   P.   Bel- 
mont,  who was attracted  to the Congressional Union's radical style.24 
Consistent with Paul's  earlier emphasis,   the Congressional Union be- 
gan its work by organizing suffrage groups  in every state to work 
for the federal amendment while  continuing to send  lobbying groups 
to the President and  to the Congress. 
The Congressional Union then began its aggressive legislative 
tactics as  it  sought  to press  the  issue of  establishing a standing 
Women's Suffrage Committee  in  the House of Representatives and forced 
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the issue in early 1914 by calling for a Democratic  caucus on the sub- 
ject.     The Democrats,  as  expected,  voted against a standing committee 
and  took the position that women's  suffrage was a question for the 
states.     The Congressional Committee,   according to Carrie Chapman 
Catt,   tried  to convince the Congressional Union not  to force the 
Democrats  to take a stand against women's  suffrage by calling for 
this vote,  but  she noted that  the Union actually wanted  to put the 
Democrats on record as a party in opposition.     The Congressional 
Union was  preparing to put   its "party in power" plan to work.     They 
announced plans  to campaign against Democrats in the suffrage states 
in the  fall  elections. 
The Congressional Committee's response  to  this action by the 
Congressional Union was to force a vote on women's suffrage  in the 
Senate on March 19,   1914.     The Committee did this,  according to Catt, 
"in full realization that  the Senate would not  give a majority." 
The vote was 35 yeas and 34 nays,   a majority but not  the two-thirds 
vote needed.     The Congressional Committee had thus given western 
Democrats a  chance  to publicly record their  individual support or 
opposition to women's suffrage.25    President Wilson took his cue from 
this action and  told the Congressional Union that he could only 
follow his party's  lead on this issue. 
After  the Senate vote,   the Congressional Committee conducted 
a poll of Senators  that showed  that many of them who basically favored 
women's suffrage felt  tied  to  the "states'   rights"  idea put  forth by 
the Democratic  caucus and  reaffirmed by President Wilson.     The 
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Congressional Committee's answer to this dilemma was  to endorse another 
amendment,   the Shafroth-Palmer amendment,  which was  introduced on 
March  12,   1914:26 
Whenever any number of legal voters of any State to a number  ex- 
ceeding eight  percent  of  the number of  legal voters voting at 
the last  preceeding General Election held  in such a State shall 
petition for the submission to  the legal voters of said  state 
the question whether women shall have equal rights with men  in 
respect  to voting at all  elections to be held in such State, 
such question shall be so submitted;   and  if,  upon such  submis- 
sion,   a majority of the legal voters of  the State voting on the 
question shall vote in favor of granting to women such equal 
rights,   the  same shall  thereupon be established,   anything  in the 
Constitution or  laws of such State  to the contrary notwithstanding. 
This  lengthy and rather wordy amendment would  simply return the  issue 
of women's suffrage  to the states and  this was  exactly the objection 
that  the Congressional Union raised.     As Harriott Stanton Blatch 
noted,   "Had  this Amendment been adopted, we should have been faced 
with  thirty nine referenda  in as many separate states.     .   .   .   the 
thought of the possibility seemed a nightmare." 
The annual convention of  the NAWSA in November of  1914 en- 
dorsed  the  Shafroth-Palmer Amendment after much debate and  this 
action caused much  turmoil for the organization because of a strong 
minority in  the NAWSA that opposed  the amendment.    The conflict  that 
developed was devisive to the NAWSA,   as  evidenced by the fact  that 
Jane Addams refused  to serve as vice-president of the NAWSA because 
of  its support  of  the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment.     She was not alone 
in her opposition,   and at   the December 1915 convention,   the NAWSA 
withdrew its support  of  the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment  and re-endorsed 
what was now called  the Bristow-Mondell Amendment.2      This proposed 
amendment stated that:     "The right  of citizens of  the United States 1 
■ 
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to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of sex."28    When the issue was thus finally re- 
solved,   the NAWSA had  lost  some of the momentum that  its leaders had 
worked so hard for.    Moreover,   the "state route" had become depress- 
ingly unsuccessful:     1914 had yielded victories only  in Nevada and 
Montana and had brought  defeats  in North Dakota,  South Dakota, 
Nebraska,  Missouri,   and Ohio.29 
The Congressional Union,  meanwhile, was  pushing forward with 
its plan to work for the defeat  of Democrats in the Congressional 
elections  in states where women could vote.    Determined  to hold  the 
"party in power"  responsible. Congressional Union compaigners went 
to the western states where women could vote and worked against Demo- 
cratic  candidates.     The success of   this attempt   is questionable.     The 
Congressional Union claimed partial  credit  for  the defeat of   twenty- 
three of  forty-three western Democrats,30 but  there were nineteen 
Democrats elected   from suffrage states to the  1915-1916 Congress, 
where there had been eighteen in the 1913-1914 session.31 
The year  1915 brought disappointment  to suffragists.    While 
the Congressional Union  continued  its  activism through visits  to  the 
President,   a cross-country automobile pilgrimage,   a huge suffrage 
petition,   and rallies and marches  in Washington,   the suffrage amend- 
ment reached  the floor of  the House of Representatives  for the first 
time and was defeated by a vote of  204 to 174.     On  the state level, 
hard  fought  campaigns were  lost  in New York,  Massachusetts,   Pennsyl- 
vania,   and New Jersey.32 
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As a response to these losses and  to the challenge posed by 
the Congressional Union,   the NAWSA reorganized its national office 
in 1915 and called  on Carrie Chapman Catt  to take over as president. 
Catt assumed  the  presidency at  the December 1915 convention and 
"immediately formulated a   'Winning Plan'  based on the concept   that 
state and  federal  efforts should reinforce each other."33    Catt's 
"Winning Plan" was  outlined  in terms of very specific actions  in each 
of the states  and   the concrete nature of her plan brought  renewed 
vigor to  the NAWSA's  program.     She also gave new direction through 
leadership,   and  Flexner's comments on this are illuminating as  to 
both Carrie Chapman Catt's and Alice Paul's methods: 
She picked   ...   a working board.     Its members were women with 
independent means who had the ability as well as the willing- 
ness  to devote  themselves  singlemindedly to their new jobs. 
.   .   .   This  of course had been  true of Miss Paul's methods 
.   .   .   and a good   deal  of the startling progress made by the 
Congressional Union was due to  it.     It did not make  for a 
socially representative leadership in either group;  but  it 
provided  two brilliant leaders with trained and experienced 
staffs who measured up to any demands  that were made upon 
them.   .   .   .  The day for the amateur reformer had given way to 
the professional  organizer. 
While the NAWSA,  under Catt,   organized  its "Winning Plan," 
Alice Paul had another concern.    With the approach of elections  in 
1916,   the Congressional Union prepared again to fight  the "party 
in power" by working against Democratic candidates.    This  election 
year would provide a  presidential contest and  the Congressional Union 
called a convention in June  to plan strategy.    At  that   convention, 
held  in Chicago,   the Congressional Union organized the National Woman's 
Party in the twelve suffrage states.34    Maud  Younger,   the keynote 
speaker,   explained   the rationale of this new party: 
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These states with their four million women constitute nearly 
one-fourth of the electoral college and more than one-third 
of  the voters necessary to elect a President.    With enough 
women organized  in each state to hold  the balance of power, 
the women's votes may determine the presidency of  the United 
States.35 
Here,   then,  was a new political  party,  based on  the startling 
notion that women could organize  to determine the outcome of a 
presidential election.     Alice Paul had  now taken her vision of party 
accountability  to  its  logical conclusion.     The National Woman's Party 
claimed that   it  could pose a threat  to political candidates.    Whether 
or not  that   threat  could become reality remained to be seen. 
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CHAPTER   III 
THE  FRAMEWORK  FOR  THE  IMAGES   (1916-1919) 
The National Woman's Party that was created by the Congres- 
sional Union has gained a special place  in suffrage history primarily 
because of  its militant  tactics   that  attracted so much publicity. 
But   the  Woman's  Party  filled   an   important  need  beyond   that  of  draw- 
ing attention  to  the cause of women's suffrage.     By tenaciously keep- 
ing the  issue of  a  constitutional amendment before the political 
hierarchy and  the  public,   the Woman's Party kept alive the  issue 
that  eventually brought   success to  the suffragists.     The tactics and 
the purpose,   considered   together,   make a story that sounds much like 
an account  of an ongoing "battle." 
The  first actions of the National Woman's Party were  in fact 
very unmilitant,  but force soon gathered  for aggressive action.     The 
Congressional Union's  1916 convention which created  the Woman's Party 
ended on June 7,   the day that  the Republican and Progressive  conven- 
tions began  in Chicago.     The Democratic  convention met  later  in Saint 
Louis.     The  platform committees of   the parties were approached about 
women's suffrage by representatives  from both  the NAWSA and  the Na- 
tional Woman's Party,   but   there was a variation in the requests  from 
the two groups.     NAWSA asked  for endorsement of the principle of votes 
for women but did not  specify the means by which this should  be accom- 
plished.     The National Woman's Party called for support of  the federal 
amendment for women's suffrage as a part of the platforms of  the parties. 
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The renegade Progressive party alone responded favorably to the 
Woman's    Party's request and did endorse the federal amendment. 
The Republican party and  the Democratic party both endorsed  the 
extension of  the vote to women by the states  through state  legis- 
lative action or referenda.! 
The Woman's Party's response to this  lack of  endorsement of 
the federal amendment by either major political party was to once 
again threaten a campaign against Democratic candidates as members 
of the "party on power."    The Woman's Party again claimed  that,  by 
virtue of controlling the Presidency and having a majority in both 
houses of Congress,   the Democrats had power that  they did not  effec- 
tively mobilize  to pass  the federal women's suffrage amendment.     In 
spite of the threat by the Woman's Party to work against him,  Wilson 
continued to refuse  to actively support women's  suffrage by federal 
amendment,   telling a Woman's Party delegation in July 1916 that  "to 
be a leader a man must always be abreast of his  party,   not ahead of 
it   .   .   .   nothing more could have been gotten from the Resolution 
Committee in Saint Louis."2    The status of the suffrage issue  in the 
election of  1916 was  further defined when the Republican nominee, 
Charles Evans Hughes,   endorsed the federal suffrage amendment on 
August  1. 
The newly formed National Woman's Party held a conference  in 
Colorado Springs,  Colorado from August   10 through August  12  to  plan 
strategy for  the campaign.     The Woman's Party did  not,   as  is often 
erroneously reported,   endorse Republican nominee Charles Evans Hughes 
at this conference,   although they did congratulate Hughes  "on the 
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unequivocal stand which he has  taken for human  liberty."    However, 
they did declare political war on  the Democratic  party in the up- 
coming elections  in a resolution that read: 
Whereas,   The present administration under President Wilson 
and  the Democratic  party have persistently opposed  the passage 
of a national suffrage amendment; 
Resolved,  That  the National Woman's Party,   so long as the 
opposition of  the Democratic party continues,   pledges  itself 
to use  its best  efforts  in the twelve states where women vote 
for President  to defeat  the Democratic candidate for President, 
and  in the eleven  states where women vote for members  of Con- 
gress  to defeat  the candidates of the Democratic party  for 
Congress.3 
A Woman's Party historian noted that  the Party did not care which 
candidates received  the women's protest votes,   "they cared only that 
women should not vote for  the Democrats.     They knew if  this protest 
vote was  large enough,   whoever was  elected would realize that opposi- 
tion to suffrage was  inexpedient."^ 
At   this point,   the National American Woman's Suffrage Associa- 
tion  issued  invitations  to both Wilson and Hughes  to address  their 
national convention in early September.     Hughes declined the invita- 
tion,   apparently feeling secure  in his position as an ally of women's 
suffrage.     Hughes'   endorsement  of the federal amendment  coupled with 
the Woman's Party's attack on the Democrats was probably a major 
factor in Wilson's acceptance of the  invitation and  in the tone of 
his speech.     Wilson's speech  to  the NAWSA convention was conciliatory 
in nature and carefully avoided any opposition to women's  suffrage 
by any method.     "I have come to  fight  not  for you but with you," de- 
clared the President,   "and   in the end I  think we shall not  quarrel 
over the method."    The response of the NAWSA convention was  stirring 
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and  enthusiastic,   and NAWSA leaders dated Wilson's complete transfor- 
mation from a sympathizer  into a true believer  in women's suffrage 
from his appearance at  this Atlantic City convention.^    The New 
Republic,   however, was a bit more skeptical of the meaning of Wilson's 
words and actions as  it pointed out   that all Wilson did was to ex- 
press "impatience" with debate over the method.     The New Republic 
was  direct   in its criticism that  the President  had only "not opposed" 
a federal amendment  during a political campaign  in which his  rival 
had openly endorsed   it. 
The Woman's Party was no more swayed by Wilson's eloquent 
rhetoric than was  the New Republic and answered  the Democratic  slogan 
of "Vote for Wilson.     He kept us out  of war" with "Vote against Wilson. 
He kept us out of suffrage."    The Woman's Party tried  to make  it  clear 
that   their opposition to Wilson was based solely on the desire to show 
the power of  the women's vote and how that vote could be brought   to 
bear against   those who would not  support  the federal amendment,  but 
that part of  their argument was often overlooked and Woman's Party 
members  rarely took great pains  to explain themselves.     As a result, 
the Woman's Party's anti-Democratic  campaign aroused much antagonism. 
There is a case to be made for  the assertion that antagonism 
was the  chief  product  of  the Woman's Party's efforts to defeat  the 
Democrats.     In spite of intense campaigns by the Woman's Party against 
President Wilson and  other Democrats,   the President carried  ten of  the 
twelve suffrage states and Democratic Congressional candidates were 
even more successful  in  the suffrage states.7    But   in spite of  these 
statistics,   the Woman's Party saw in the results of  the 1916 election 
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"tremendous  strides   towards victory" in that women's  suffrage had 
been made an  issue of national  importance,   the Democrats had been 
put  on the defensive,  and,   the Woman's Party claimed,  Democratic 
majorities had been significantly reduced.8 
After less than spectacular  results at the polls,   the National 
Woman's Party returned  its attention to Washington.     When President 
Wilson appeared  to open the second  session of  the Sixty-Fourth Con- 
gress his  speech   included no reference to women's suffrage.     Having 
received advance word of  this omission and not content  that  the issue 
should  go unmentioned,   several members of the Woman's Party stationed 
themselves  in the  Senate gallery and unfurled a banner asking,   "Mr. 
President,   What Will You Do For Woman's Suffrage?" at a strategic 
point   in Wilson's  speech.    The President—and everyone else  in the 
chamber—saw the banner,  and  the President's speech had to share 
headlines with women's  suffrage in the next day's papers.9 
The Woman's Party continued   its activities on Christmas Day 
1916, when an audience gathered at   the United  States Capitol  to pay 
tribute  to Inez    Milholland Boissevain,  an active member of  the 
Woman's Party who had died from a  stroke as she campaigned against 
the Democrats   in the fall campaign.     (Woman's Party lore tells  that 
her last words were:     "How long must women wait  for liberty?")10 
The Woman's Party received permission to present  their memorial 
resolutions to President Wilson,  and on January 9,   1917   the President 
received   them.     Unwilling  to let an  opportunity slip by,   the Woman's 
Party representatives used  the chance to call  on the President  for 
support  for women's suffrage,   pleading that  "our women are 
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exhausting their  lives   in waiting and appeal."11    The President an- 
swered by scolding the women for presenting themselves under false 
pretenses and said   that  he was prepared only to receive the memorial 
resolutions.     Wilson went on to state  that  "I am bound as leader of 
a Party  ....  my commands come from that Party and not from private 
personal convictions."*■*    The women of  that delegation were as  indig- 
nant over  their reception by the President  as  the President was over 
their abuse of  the privilege of  securing an appointment with him. 
At  a meeting that night   to discuss how to voice their dissatisfaction, 
the women decided  to picket  the White House gates  the next morning. 
The picketing that  began on January 10,   1917 and lasted for 
over a year and a half brought  the Woman's Party notoriety as well 
as publicity for women's suffrage.     The pickets,   stationing themselves 
at the White House gates so that both Wilson and visitors could not 
enter or leave without being reminded of the women's suffrage  issue, 
stood  silently holding banners asking,   "Mr.   President,  What Will You 
Do For Woman's Suffrage?" and "How Long Must Women Wait For Liberty?"13 
"Silent sentinels," they appeared at the White House every day,   rain 
or shine,   except   for Sundays.     Days on which special groups made up 
the picket  line—Teacher Days,   State Days,   etc.--were organized  to 
show the widespread  support   for women's suffrage among a wide range 
of professions,   classes,  and geographical regions.     President Wilson 
took to tipping his hat   to  the pickets as he entered and left the White 
House gates.     Both the pickets and  the police were passive  in these 
early stages  of  the  picketing. 
34 
Up until  this  point,   two organizations,   the National Woman's 
Party and  the Congressional Union,  had continued  to operate under 
Alice Paul's  leadership.     On March 2,   1917,  at a meeting to plan a 
joint Congressional Union-National Woman's Party demonstration for 
Wilson's inauguration,   Paul recommended  the merger of  the  two organi- 
zations into one organization under the name of  the National Woman's 
Party.     Since Paul's tactics were shifting from concentration on 
lobbying work to highly visible and more militant demonstrations,   it 
seemed  that  greater unity of purpose could be served by one organiza- 
tion;  and since the Presidential  election was over,  Paul felt  that 
the need for an organization composed only of voting women was past. 
Accordingly,   the two organizations were merged and  the first show 
of strength of  the "new" National Women's Party was a moving picket 
line that surrounded the White House four times on Wilson's  inaugura- 
tion day, March 4,   1917—in  the pouring rain! 
A unity of  purpose was evident   even as Paul's followers ad- 
justed  to this major structural reorganization.     At  the March 1917 
meeting that brought  the merger of  the Congressional Union and the 
National Woman's Party,   the "new" Woman's Party pledged  itself   to 
continue to work solely for suffrage and not  to be diverted by war 
work if  the United States did enter the European war.14    When the 
country did enter World War  I on April 6,   1917,  all suffragists were 
faced with  the dilemma of priorities.     The NAWSA decided to continue 
suffrage work and  to offer  its services   to the government for war 
work.15    The National Woman's Party,  with a  large number of Quakers 
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in leadership roles,   did not offer the services  of  the organization 
for war work.     This  in itself  provoked little adverse reaction,   for 
individual members were  free to and did engage in war work.     But re- 
action to the Woman's Party grew hostile when the banners of  the pick- 
et began to exploit wartime events.16    The President's words  that 
justified  the United States'   entrance  into  the war were transformed 
into a banner with a suffrage message:     "We shall fight for  the things 
which we have always held nearest  our hearts—for democracy,   for the 
right of those who submit  to authority  to have a voice  in their own 
governments."17    Bolder banners later referred to "Kaiser Wilson." 
Some called this brand of picketing traitorous.    Mob violence against 
the picketers  erupted  for  the first  time when the banners told visit- 
ing representatives of  the Russian government   that  the United  States 
was a "democracy in name only."    The police warned  the women that 
the picketing would have  to stop, but  the pickets continued.     The 
first group of women was arrested on June 22,   1917 and was charged 
with "obstructing sidewalk  traffic." 
At  first   the pickets were dismissed without court  sentences 
but with stern warnings to  end   the picketing.     However,   as one  group 
of women was arrested,   another group would take its place.     Soon,   the 
courts began to sentence the women to short prison terms and even- 
tually began handing down six months sentences  to be served in  the 
Occoquan workhouse.     In reality,   the pickets had broken no  law but 
were some of  the first  twentieth century Americans to suffer sus- 
pension of  their civil liberties during wartime.I8    These women,  who 
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were arrested  illegally In order to remove a glaring example of pro- 
test   from  the capital of a nation that was almost hysterically com- 
mitted to  the super-patriotism that only a war can bring,  met sub- 
standard conditions and hostile treatment   in Occoquan.    Whenever a 
group was  released  from jail,  a reception was held for them at the 
Woman's Party headquarters where  they would  tell stories of sickening 
and humiliating experiences.     When Lucy Burns and Alice Paul were 
imprisoned,   they organized and  led hunger strikes which brought more 
bad publicity to the authorities when jail officials began forced 
feeding.     Reality combined with publicity  turned  the jailed women 
into bona fide martyrs,   an image that the Woman's Party did nothing 
to  disclaim. 
The picketing—and especially the publicity connected with 
the jail experiences of  the pickets—created several kinds of pres- 
sure.     Dudley Field Malone,   appointed by Wilson to  the prestigious 
position of Collector of  the Port  of New York,   resigned his  post in 
September of   1917 as  a protest  against  the  treatment of  the suffrag- 
ists.     This action was a public repudiation of the administration's 
stand by a man whom Wilson admired and trusted.19    In addition to 
this pressure on Wilson,   the Woman's Party sent  speakers all over the 
country telling of  the plight  of  the suffragist prisoners.20    Malone's 
resignation and  the continued  publicity that  the ever present  pickets 
and  the suffering prisoners received finally led  the administration 
to act.     In late November  1917,   all the pickets were released  from 
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prison and  the District of Columbia Court of Appeals  subsequently in- 
validated both  the arrests  and  the sentences. 
The  publicity gained by the picketing and the women's  protests 
from jail had obviously made some  impact:     the day after the chairman 
of the Senate Women's  Suffrage Committee visited the Occoquan work- 
house,   the Committee sent a  favorable report on the women's suffrage 
amendment  to  the  Senate,  and  in mid-September a House Committee on 
Women's  Suffrage was  created.     The impact of the news stories created 
by the picketing and the jail experiences of Woman's Party members 
can be further inferred  from  the facts that the pickets were released 
from jail a week before Congress reconvened and that the House set a 
date to vote on the amendment  only one week after the session was 
opened.21    But  perhaps   the most  telling impact of Woman's Party ac- 
tivities  came  in October of 1917 when Woodrow Wilson endorsed the 
federal amendment  for women's  suffrage.    Wilson called for the amend- 
ment as a  "war measure," a means to  include women fully in the efforts 
of democracy to triumph over evil.22 
It would be a mistake to attribute Wilson's endorsement of 
the women's suffrage amendment   solely to  the actions of  the Woman's 
Party.    Women's status  in  the United  States had been advanced by sig- 
nificant and visible  contributions to  the war effort by women.     In 
addition,   the NAWSA's increasing effectiveness was attested  to by the 
fact   that   five states-North Dakota,   Nebraska,  Rhode Island,  New York, 
and Arkansas—granted women the  right   to vote  in 1917.23     In any case, 
following Wilson's endorsement,   the federal women's suffrage amendment 
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was passed by  the House of Representatives on January 10,   1918 by a 
vote of  274 to  136,   exactly the two-thirds majority needed. 
With  this preliminary victory accomplished,  the Woman's Party 
intensified its   lobbying efforts  in the Senate,   using an elaborate 
card  file  that   included  information on each Senator.     The picket 
lines were transferred   to  the doors of  the Senate chambers.     But a 
group of Senators  threatened a  filibuster and  action seemed  stalled 
as  the year wore on.     The President  appealed  to  the Senate on Septem- 
ber  30,   1918  to pass  the women's suffrage amendment as a war measure 
in order "to make our country a democracy in deed as well as  in name."24 
The next day the Senate voted 62  to 34 in favor of the amendment—two 
votes short  of  the required two-thirds majority.     As a  result,   the 
Congressional elections  of 1918  found not only  the Woman's Party 
opposing Democrats but   the NAWSA opposing key anti-suffragist   Sena- 
tors.     This  latter development can be seen as at  least a partial vali- 
dation of the political weapons that   the Woman's Party had been using 
all along.25 
In December of 1918,  Woodrow Wilson opened  the  "lame-duck" 
session of the Sixty-Fifth Congress by again asking for the passage 
of  the women's  suffrage amendment.     After these words in support of 
women's suffrage,  Wilson sailed for  the Versailles Peace Conference. 
The National Woman's  Party did not  accept what  they considered  to be 
the President's  late and safe endorsement as his ticket  to respecta- 
bility  in suffrage circles.     While  the NAWSA was praising Wilson for 
his generous  support,   the National Woman's Party convention in 
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mid-December 1918 held  a march and demonstration where they burned 
copies of  the President's speeches on democracy.    Mrs.  John Rogers 
explained: 
Our ceremony today  is planned to call attention to the fact 
that  the President has gone abroad  to establish democracy in 
foreign lands when he has  failed   to establish democracy at 
home.    We burn his words  on  liberty today,  not in malice or 
anger,   but  in a spirit of reverence for truth. 
On January   1,   1919,   the Woman's Party began an ambitious proj- 
ect:     to keep a  "watchfire" burning at  the White House at  all  times 
and to burn copies  of   the President's speeches on democracy in that 
watchfire until  the federal women's suffrage amendment was  passed. 
Though  the watchfire was guarded by Woman's Party pickets,   it did not 
burn continuously,   for the police soon arrived to extinguish the fire 
and  later began arrests.     But  the suffrage issue was kept before the 
public by virtue of   the publicity attracted by this flurry of activity 
as well as  the Woman's Party's  "Prison Special," a train which car- 
ried Woman's Party members across  the nation telling the story of 
their prison  terms.26 
On February 10,   1919,   the amendment  came before the Senate 
for  its  last chance  in the Sixty-Fifth Congress:     it was defeated by 
one vote.     The Sixty-sixth Congress,  which contained  the new members 
elected   in the fall  of  1918,   convened on May 20,   1919.     When the 
President   telegraphed his speech to Congress  from Versailles, he 
again recommended passage of  the amendment.    On May 21,   the House, 
in its first order of business,  passed  the amendment by a vote of 
304 to 89.     The Woman's Party then  intensified  lobbying efforts  in 
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the Senate,   and,   on June 4,   the Senate finally passed  the woman's 
suffrage amendment  and sent  It  to  the states for ratification.2' 
The story of  the National Woman's Party,  however,   continues 
far beyond  the Congressional  passage of  the women's suffrage amend- 
ment.     Paul,   in fact,  was not even present  in Washington on the day 
that  the Senate passed  the amendment, having left several days 
earlier to begin work for ratification in the states where  legisla- 
tures were  in session.28    Urging governors  to call special sessions 
of their legislatures to ratify the amendment  so that women could 
vote in the  1920 elections,   the efforts of  Paul and her Woman's 
Party cohorts helped  to bring about  the speedy ratification process 
that culminated on August  26,   1920 when the women's suffrage amend- 
ment became the Nineteenth Amendment   to the United  States Constitu- 
tion.29    It  was  the Congressional fight,  however,   that brought   the 
publicity that   established several strikingly different   images of 
the National Woman's Party.    Accordingly,   it  is  the period of  this 
fight,  June   1916 to June  1919,   that will  provide the background 
against which several of   these images will now be explored. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IMAGE:     ALICE  PAUL AS  A LEADER 
There can be no doubt that Alice Paul was a woman whose leader- 
ship qualities were  indeed impressive.     She evoked feelings of   intense 
devotion in some quarters,   distrust  and even hatred  in others.     But no 
one seemed  to have feelings of  indifference towards her.     It   is hard 
to grasp what  peculiar  charisma made Alice Paul such a forceful 
figure,   for  though her name surfaces   throughout   the suffrage story, 
thoughtful analysis of her personality and  the forces  that  drove her 
is non-existent.     There are,   though,   clues scattered throughout  the 
story. 
National Woman's Party Materials 
The esteem with which Alice Paul was held by  the members of 
the National Woman's Party  is best  shown by the exalted  place that 
she was  given  in a Woman's Party account of  the suffrage struggle: 
When the unbiased story of  the struggle of American women  is 
finally written,   three women will stand out—all Quakers  and 
all militants,   in that  they defied  the prejudices of  their  time: 
Lucretia Mott,   who first declared for Woman's Rights at a public 
meeting;   Susan  B.  Anthony,   the first  suffragist   to defy prison 
for suffrage;   and Alice Paul,   the young modern leader of  the 
National Woman's Party,  who went with her  little army of women 
from the east,   the west,   and the south to the suffrage picket 
line and  to prison.' 
To place Alice Paul on the  same level as Lucretia Mott and  Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton  implied  "super-star" status among suffragists.    This 
"super-star" of  the Woman's Party also seemed to be an individual 
so impressive  that  she was almost  too remote to relate to  in any 
- 
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kind of a personal way.     National Woman's Party historian,   Inez 
Irwin,   reinforces  this  impression  in her Story of the Woman's Party: 
There is no difference of opinion in regard  to Alice Paul  in the 
Woman's Party.     With one accord,   they say,   "She is  the Party." 
They regard her with an admiration which verges on awe.    Mentally 
she walks apart,   not because she has any conscious sense of 
superiority,  but because of  the swiftness,  amplitude,   and com- 
pleteness with which her mind marches.2 
There is  evidence,   however,   in some personal correspondence 
between Woman's Party members  that Alice Paul,   for all her effective- 
ness,  was sometimes abrasive.    Mary Beard expressed some concern to 
Lucy Burns about Paul's treatment of  financial contributors and of 
legislators: 
Mrs.  Belmont   is justified  in not wanting to be considered merely 
a money bag;   but  she says she does not intend  to interfere with 
you—only wants  to be asked for her opinion now and then.   .   .   . 
You will not  let Alice Paul  interview congressmen any more, 
if you can help  it, will you?    Someone else can do it better  if 
there is anything in rumors.3 
But  later,   Beard showed a change of heart as she wrote,   "  I wish I 
had never written you  that Alice Paul must not be allowed to see 
congressmen.   ...     I  so understand now that  the person who does 
see them must know how to answer them.     That she does."'1    One must 
speculate that   this "back-and-forth" attitude on the part of some 
of Paul's closest  colleagues might   indicate abruptness that  occa- 
sionally bordered on unpleasantness on Paul's part. 
But for publication,   Irwin records  the very flattering impres- 
sion of Paul's associates,   even though few of  them speak of her out- 
side of  the context of Party work: 
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Winifred Mallon speaks of her "burning sincerity"  .   .   .  Nina 
Allender sums her up as "a Napoleon without self-indulgence. 
.   .   ."    Maud Younger's tribute:     "she has   ...   a devotion to 
the cause which  is absolutely self-sacrificing.     She has an 
indomitable will.     She recognizes no obstacles.   ..."    Lucy 
Burns  says:     "Her great assets,   I should say,  are her powers, 
with a single  leap of the imagination,   to make plans on a 
national scale;   and a supplementary power to see that done 
down to the  last  postage stamp.     But because she can do all 
this,   people let her do it—Her abruptness lost some workers, 
but not  the finer spirits."5 
Although such adulation was not characteristic of the National 
Woman's Party magazine, The Suffragist,   over which Alice Paul had 
considerable editorial impact,   the image conveyed by the Woman's 
Party materials is of an incredibly resourceful organizer who was, 
indeed,   the guiding  force of the Woman's Party.     It seems  then that 
Woman's Party members,   though sometimes bothered by Paul's abrupt- 
ness, were almost unanimous in their admiration for her organiza- 
tional skills and her commitment to their cause. 
NAWSA Materials 
On the other hand,   the National American Woman's  Suffrage 
Association largely ignored Alice Paul in its materials.     She was 
rarely mentioned  in the NAWSA's magazine, Woman's Journal  (later. 
Woman Citizen),   and when she was mentioned, she was portrayed as a 
misfit or a "rabble-rouser."    She received greatest attention in NAWSA 
materials  in connection with her early involvement with the National 
and the conditions surrounding her separation from it.    The History 
of Woman Suffrage reports  that,   in 1912,  Alice Paul and Lucy Burns 
"came back to the United  States filled with zeal to inaugurate a 
campaign of   'militancy'   here.     The idea was coldly received by the 
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suffrage leaders.   .   .   ."6    NAWSA president,   Carrie Chapman Catt, 
implied  that Alice Paul misrepresented her motives by her abuse of 
what Catt saw as a large grant of power within the NAWSA:     "The Board," 
Catt  stated,   "gave her the prestige of  the chairmanship of  its Con- 
gressional Committee and provided her with the stationery of  the 
Association and   the list of its usual contributors."^    The History 
of Woman Suffrage does report admiration for Alice Paul's  "astonish- 
ing executive ability        but goes  on to give an account of the  insub- 
ordination that Catt  had  implied: 
The Congressional Union,   instead of being merely a local society 
to assist  the committee  in its efforts with Congress,   as Miss 
Paul has  said, was a national organization  to work for the Federal 
Amendment.   .   .   .     The Association's  letterheads had been used for 
this purpose.   .   .   .    Miss Paul had been obtaining names for mem- 
bership  in the Union during all  the sessions of  the convention. 
This report concluded with the notation that  "she  [Paul]  was at once 
relieved from the chairmanship of the Congressional Committee."9 
From this point on,   the NAWSA's history mentions Alice Paul 
only as a spokesman for the rival National Woman's Party.     Subsequent 
reference to Paul's leadership quality consists of one sentence that 
is included  in the History of Woman Suffrage's summary of "Woman Suf- 
frage Associations   in the United States":     "It   [NWP]   was a small but 
very active organization and Miss Paul was the supreme head with no 
restrictions."10    This judgment of Alice Paul as a near dictator is 
consistent with the image that  the NAWSA generally conveyed about her. 
This image includes both dictator-like qualities and a manipulative 
exploitation of her  executive abilities.     It is  to the NAWSA's credit 
that this image was not explicit or stressed—it was only implied. 
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And, for the most part, the National—perhaps out of fear, perhaps 
out of a desire to avoid more division within the suffrage ranks— 
largely  ignored Paul and her organization. 
Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals 
That Alice Paul could be "ignored" at any stage of her politi- 
cal activism seems unthinkable,  but the NAWSA was not alone in this 
practice.     In  the early stages of her career as a suffrage leader, 
contemporary newspapers and periodicals gave no special attention to 
Paul as a leader.    Mentioned  in news articles and her comments  some- 
times  quoted,   she began to make headlines only as her actions became 
more militant.     As early as July  1916,   the New York Times led  a news 
story with the title:     "Paul Gives Demands to Hughes."11    In 1917, 
when the arrests of the pickets had been occurring for some time,   it 
was worthy of note that Alice Paul was arrested;   the headlines  read: 
"Arrest Four More Pickets—Miss Alice Paul Among Quartet  in White 
House Demonstration."12    Refraining from editorializing against  her 
militant tactics  in the early stages,   the New York Times apparently 
found her increasingly    newsworthy as her militance became more visible. 
On November  7,   1917,   for example,   a  long article,   "Miss Alice Paul on 
Hunger Strike" appeared.13    This was followed by a more spectacular 
three column story on November 9,  under the banner:     "Hunger Striker 
is Forcibly Fed—Miss Alice Paul,   a Suffragist Picket,   is Greatly 
Exhausted after  the Ordeal-Had Fasted for  78 Hours-Washington Offi- 
cials Said She Would Die Unless  Strenuous Measures Were Taken."14 
This  somewhat gruesome story was  told  in much detail but  there was 
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little attention to Paul herself.     The image conveyed at  this stage 
was  of a curious militant who was characterized as having no depth 
of personality. 
Not until relatively late in Paul's suffrage career did the 
New York Times provide any in-depth analysis on this new personality 
that  they had reported on for several years.     On May 25,   1919, when 
passage of  the women's suffrage amendment was eminent,   the Times,   on 
the front  page of  its Sunday Magazine section,   printed an interview 
with Alice Paul entitled:     "Pressure for Suffrage."    On the whole, 
the article did a reasonable job of presenting  impressions without 
making judgments: 
She is a Quaker.     At  first  sight she looks  that part more than 
the militant  suffragist who,   for picketing the President,  re- 
ceived a sentence of seven months  imprisonment.    Her manners 
are quiet,   her voice  low.   ...     It  is only on close scrutiny 
that one  perceives her underlying firmness and ability to fight 
to a finish.   .   .   .     She had made a study of representative 
government behind  the scenes,   and  she took the tools of  the 
boss politican in bringing political pressure to bear.     It is 
now conceded,  by the best of  the men politicans,  that she played 
their game with extraordinary success.15 
Curiosity of the New York Times as to Paul's leadership qualities  thus 
finally led to a reasonable inquiry and a begruding admiration for her 
strengths.     Prior to the approaching passage of the women's suffrage 
amendment,  however,   the Times seemed generally indifferent  to Paul as 
anything other  than a one-dimensional militant who provided an occasional 
news  story with her bizarre antics. 
Articles on Alice Paul herself  in other contemporary periodicals 
are rare and,   for the most  part,  are too biased either toward or against 
her to be taken seriously as historical evidence.     In October,   1919, 
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Everybody's Magazine published an exceedingly complimentary article 
on Alice Paul.    With the light  tone characteristic of this "conver- 
sational" magazine,   the article presented Paul as a small-town girl 
who,   though she had made an impact on the world,  still provoked only 
admiration in her hometown: 
"What  do you think of all these goings-on?" I asked her 
mother.     She sighed. 
"Well,  Mr.   Paul always used  to say, when there was anything 
hard and disagreeable  to be done.'I bank on Alice!'" lf> 
The level of analysis  in this  "in-depth"  interview obviously makes 
this article of   little use. 
Under the guidance of Freda Kirchwey,  the Nation provided a 
sharp contrast   to the Everybody's article in a piece titled "Alice 
Paul Pulls the Strings."    As the title implies,   Kirchwey conveyed an 
image of Alice Paul as a dictatorial  leader and accused her of un- 
wisely keeping the Woman's Party's programs limited to a single issue. 
Someday the story of the National Woman's Party will be  told. 
It will be an interesting story,  full of strange contradictions. 
...   It will be full of idealism and  steadfast purpose and yet 
of a readiness to use any trick or pretense that might bring 
that purpose nearer to  fulfilment.   ...     But  that  story can not 
be written until the people who know it  get out from under the 
spell of the Alice Paul legend.   17 
Other periodical coverage of Alice Paul  is sketchy and often 
negative.    Typical is a 1923 Century Magazine article,   "Women in the 
Washington Scene," which mentioned Paul as one who had  emerged from 
the fight for the women's  suffrage amendment  only to tackle the fight 
for an equal rights amendment:     "She is a revolutionist   in tactics, 
and has   the revolutionists'   singlemindedness and destructive insistence 
and disregard of persons."18    This   image,   like Kirchwey's,   is negative, 
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but  a new dimension  is added  to  the description of Alice Paul:     an 
unfeeling revolutionary for whom the end justifies  the means.     This 
is an extreme example of  the generally negative treatment  that  Paul 
received from major  press  sources. 
As would be expected,   the images of Alice Paul as a   leader 
are dramatically  influenced by the source and  the timing of  the media 
coverage she received.     While National Woman's Party materials are 
glowing in  their  praise of her as a superior organizer and   leader, 
the NAWSA downplayed her role in the suffrage movement—belittling 
and even ignoring her.    The popular press  found in her an interesting 
case,  whose flair for the dramatic brought her early headlines and 
who only earned  legitimacy for her leadership when her cause was al- 
most won.     But  even the most vehement anti-suffragist writer  for the 
New York Times and the Woman's Party's Inez Irwin would have to agree 
that Alice Paul was a capable  leader who  inspired strong feelings 
among those around her.     It  seems  that  she was an individual who single- 
mindedly approached her  task and was willing to take risks and  to offend 
people  if  that was what was necessary to reach her goal.     Her organi- 
zational abilities  can not be  ignored,   for  they are referred  to in 
every source.     Yet neither can Paul's  tendency to be domineering be 
neglected:    while the NAWSA pictured her as manipulative and  the NWP 
members admit  only  to her "abruptness,"  the difference  is  largely rhe- 
torical.     Alice Paul was a skillful leader—with her own strengths and 
weaknesses.    An apt  summation of Paul's  image as a  leader is  found  in 
the title of an article in a  1934 Literary Digest  that   included a dis- 
cussion of Alice Paul's activities:     "They Stand Out From the Crowd."!" 
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CHAPTER V 
IMAGE:     POLITICAL  STRATEGY  OF THE WOMAN'S  PARTY 
Analysis  In the media of  the political strategy of the Woman's 
Party,   particularly as  it  related  to a constitutional amendment for 
women's suffrage and  to working to unseat Democratic politicans as 
representatives of the  "party in power," brought  forth a great deal 
of criticism from non-Woman's Party sources and much defensive justi- 
fication from the Woman's Party.     The images that  each group culti- 
vated are striking  in their differences. 
National Woman's Party Materials 
The Woman's Party never deviated  from its conviction that a 
constitutional amendment was the only effective way to insure the 
vote for women.     Inez Irwin,   Woman's Party historian,  described the 
Shafroth-Palmer amendment  that would return the question of women's 
suffrage to  the states as offering  "a path to the enfranchisement of 
women incredibly cluttered and cumbered."1    Harriott Stanton Blatch 
asked,   "Why should we pass a Federal Amendment which promised us 
nothing but a referendum in the end?"    and guessed  that  the Shafroth- 
Palmer was: 
Suggested by Congressmen who wished to give women some political 
crocheting  to occupy their hands and relieve Congress  of their 
disconcerting attentions.     It   [the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment] 
might well have had for  its short  title,   "A bill to encourage 
tatting for women." 
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Blatch's  indignant attitude was expressive of the Woman's Party's view 
of  fighting for suffrage through  the  states,   the strategy adopted by 
the NAWSA.     Further  insight into the feeling behind this Woman's 
Party rhetoric  about strategy is evident  in Woman's Party correspon- 
dence.     When the National Association began agitation for court action 
to establish women's  suffrage under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mary 
Beard fired off  the following letter to Alice Paul: 
Since the absurd action of the delegates to the National I 
no longer feel we can pay the slightest attention to any idea 
held by such women. We certainly have had a fine demonstration 
of the unfitness of women to vote. . . . The whole question of 
the relation of the suffrage to the Fourteenth Amendment was 
thoroughly settled by the Supreme Court in Minor vs Halpersett, 
21 Wall   (62(1874)   [sic].   .   .   . 
Why in God's name didn't   these women consult someone who 
knows  something if  they know nothing themselves?    It makes all 
suffragists   look so ridiculous.   .   .   .    All of us become a laugh- 
ing stock through  this action.3 
It  is  clear that  there was  no patience in the Woman's Party with methods 
of obtaining the vote other than through a federal amendment. 
An even more controversial strategic   issue was the  "party in 
power" doctrine.     The Suffragist  closely followed the development  of 
the platforms of  the three parties  in 1916 and gave elaborate justifi- 
cation for  the Woman's Party's stand against  the Democrats.     A July 
headline read:     "President Wilson Determined Opponent of Federal 
Suffrage Amendment."4    The editorial page of  the Suffragist on August  5 
took the form of a  two column comment.     One column was headed:     "Demo- 
cratic Opposition to National Suffrage."    The other was  titled:     "Mr. 
Hughes  for the Anthony Amendment."5 
A lengthy and  involved discussion of Woman's Party strategy was 
printed   in the August  26,   1916 edition of the Suffragist  in an article 
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by Columbia professor Charles Beard entitled  "Tactics  and  Explosives.' 
He began the article by announcing that  the text was a "letter  to a 
suffragist of  the old school."    The fact was that Beard was answering 
Catt's  criticism of an article of his that had appeared  in the New 
Republic,6      crediting the Woman's Party with the new interest  in 
women's suffrage among the political parties.     He provided the most 
solid defense of  the Women's Party's anti-Democratic stance  that 
appeared   in the Suffragist,   stating that   "all  that was got at Chicago 
and Saint Louis was got only because of  the threats of  the Woman's 
Party."    He pointed out that  the National Association had no  impact 
on the political conventions over  the years "simply because  it 
wielded no instrument  except women's silent  influence."    He then 
challenged  the NAWSA:     "You say that you represent 97% of  the women 
suffragists.     That may be true,  but  it would have required only 
thirty-five votes in  the 1912 Nevada congressional election to turn 
the scale.     It   is not mere numbers  that count in war or politics;   it 
is tactics and explosives."' 
From the  time that Beard's  rationale appeared,   the Suffragist 
became  increasingly aggressive in its anti-Democratic stance.     The 
September 9,   1916  issue was  full of   indignation.    An article entitled 
"Congress Adjourned—No Action on Suffrage Amendment" commented that 
Congress had adjourned after four years in which the Democrats had 
controlled Congress and the White House.     In answer to  the question, 
"What has  the Democratic Party done  for women's enfranchisement?" the 
editors summarized: 
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The President:     -refused to support  the federal suffrage 
amendment 
Senate: -35-34 vote;   FOR      27% Democrats 
47% Republicans 
100% Progressives 
House: -174-204 vote;   FOR 31% Democrats 
64% Republicans 
100% Progressive Republicans 
93% Progressives 
100% Independents 8 
By articles and  statistical compilations  like these,   the Suffragist 
was persistent   in its justification of  the Woman's Party's anti- 
Democratic stand as a politically astute and necessary move. 
In reflecting on President Wilson's motives for his appearance 
at the NAWSA convention in September of 1916,   the Suffragist  claimed 
that the "party in power" doctrine of the Woman's Party was having 
an impact.     Wilson,   it was  claimed,   recognized "how necessary   .   .   . 
it  is at   this critical period of his election campaign to counteract, 
by some conciliatory public statement,   the effect of his prolonged 
hostility  to  the suffrage amendment   in Congress."9    It was,   of course, 
the Woman's Party that had forced this realization!     A few weeks 
nearer to  the election,   the  Suffragist answered criticism that  the 
Woman's Party was  receiving for its anti-Wilson attitude.     The editor 
claimed that the members of  the Woman's Party were 
.   .   .  very indifferent  indeed about Mr. Wilson.   .   .   .   They 
would view with composure the re-election of Mr. Wilson— 
but not   in the equal suffrage states and not by the help of 
women^T votes.   ...   If  that   [women's  opposition]   is made 
clear,   it  is a matter of total indifference to the Woman s 
Party-so far as suffrage  is concerned-who is the next Presi- 
dent of  the United States. 10 
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The Woman's Party did not have the dramatic impact on the 
November elections that was hoped for.  But the Suffragist was 
enthusiastic in its assessment of the results. The editors claimed 
little concern that the Woman's Party had not turned the election 
around and said that "it made no difference who was elected. . . . 
What we did try to do was organize a protest vote by women against 
Mr. Wilson's attitude toward suffrage.  This we did."11 
In April of 1918, when the Senate was running out of time to 
vote on the suffrage amendment, the Suffragist reminded its readers 
that "Power to pass the resolution through the Senate is with the 
Democratic administration."12 The following October, when the 
Suffragist reported on the defeat of the women's suffrage amendment 
in the Senate, there was no doubt left as to who should be blamed. 
The editor declared that it "was defeated because of lack of Demo- 
cratic support. ... 73% of the Republicans voted for it against 
57% of the Democrats."13 
The Suffragist continued to publish criticism of the party 
in power and encouraging rhetoric for its workers until the suffrage 
amendment was passed.  A large number of articles, both pro and con, 
were reprinted from major newspapers around the country, including 
the New York Times' belated interview with Alice Paul, "Her Pressure 
on Congress."^ When the amendment was finally passed by Congress, 
the Suffragist announced "a New Task," that of ratification by thirty- 
six states.15 Plans for strategy were not to stop for the Woman's 
Party when the congressional fight was over. 
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NAWSA Materials 
The NAWSA materials available show a surprising lack of hostile 
comment on the political strategy of the National Woman's Party.     But 
this   is primarily a  lack of any comment at all.    The Woman's Party is 
most  often simply mentioned as a group whose approach differed  from 
that   of  the National Association's.     As regards the  Shafroth-Palmer 
amendment,   the NAWSA leaders did not attack the Woman's Party for 
its non-support but  only tried to explain their view of  it.    Accord- 
ing to Catt,   its object was  to simply add  states to the suffrage list. 
She saw it as a  "support  to the pending Federal Suffrage Amendment," 
and,   full of justification,   she pointed out that   "the arguments for 
and against had served  to bring the question of suffrage by federal 
amendment still more prominently to the front."16    This  "defense," 
of course,  benefitted  from the advantages  of hindsight!     As to the 
"party in power"  doctrine,   the History of Woman Suffrage provides an 
an unimpassioned critique of this notion: 
...   the Union announced its program of  fighting the candidates 
of  the Democratic  Party without any reference to their position 
on the Federal Amendment or their record on woman suffrage.   .   .   . 
The policy of  the Congressional Union,   put  into action throughout 
the presidential campaign of 1916. made any cooperation  [between 
the Union and NAWSA]   impossible.17 
With this comment,   the NAWSA closed  its discussion of the National 
Woman's  Party's political strategy in the "official" history of  the 
woman's suffrage movement. 
The Woman's Journal,   the official publication of the NAWSA,   pro- 
vided only brief and  irregular coverage of the National Woman's Party- 
but  the coverage was  fairly objective.     In July of 1916,   the Womanjs 
. 
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Journal announced  the coming Conference of the Woman's Party at Colo- 
rado Springs  "to decide on measures  to be adopted by the Woman's Party 
in the coming election."!8    The August  19,   1916 Woman's Journal con- 
tained a surprisingly supportive editorial,  "The Woman's Party."    It 
noted that   the New York Times had denounced the decision of the Woman's 
Party to oppose Woodrow Wilson and went on to defend the right of  the 
Woman's Party to do  this!     According to the Woman's Journal,   the 
women's suffrage amendment was,  for women,   "the most  important measure 
now before Congress" and  the vehemence of the Woman's Party was under- 
standable.     The editors pointed out what they saw as  "the fundamental 
weakness of  the Woman's Party" in that "it represents only a very 
small  fraction of the voters   in the enfranchised states" but went on 
to conclude  that   "the Woman's Party has a perfect right  to  try to de- 
feat President Wilson."19    The NAWSA did not say that  it  endorsed the 
Woman's Party's activities,  but  it is noteworthy that  the National de- 
fended the Woman's Party's right to use the strategy that  it chose. 
The biggest criticism of the strategy of the Woman's  Party that 
the NAWSA voiced was that  it caused a glaring split in the suffrage 
ranks.     Eleanor Flexner reports that  the NAWSA was concerned that  in 
1916 the Congressional Union was drawing those committed to a federal 
amendment away from the National.    A Report of the Survey Committee 
to the NAWSA Board of Officers in March of  1916 noted that the "com- 
bination   (of NAWSA-CU)  has produced a great muddle from which the 
National can be freed only by careful action."20    Carrie Chapman Catt 
went  further  in her assessment that  the Congressional Union had 
created a discontent  that   "brought a complexity of troublesome 
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problems which  tremendously increased  the strain of suffrage leaders 
and workers."21    This,   in the views of  the NAWSA leaders,  seemed to 
be the greatest   transgression of the National Woman's Party.     In 
reality,   it seems  that  the strategy of  the Woman's Party attracted 
women who would have been impatient with the non-flamboyant tactics 
of  the NAWSA.       The existence of  the two groups and  their varying 
strategies seemed   to broaden the base of  the suffrage movement, 
rather  than to restrict  it. 
Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals 
In terms  of  the contemporary press,   the New York Times was 
the most  consistent  critic of the political strategy used by the 
Woman's Party.     The extent  of this criticism is reflected  in the 
exasperated comment by activist Inez Milholland Boissevain in a 
1916 Suffragist:     "Now there are people who believe that women are 
not human beings.     There are Turks,   infidels,   the House of Lords 
in England   .   .   .   [and]   the New York Times!"22    The question of why 
the New York Times  had such anti-suffragist  tendencies and held such 
a consistent anti-Woman's  Party stance is attributable  to what edi- 
torial writer Elmer Davis readily admitted  in the 1921  "company 
biography": 
On the major  issues of  these eight years   [of  the Wilson administra- 
tion]   the paper supported  the President.   .   .   . The Times  in recent 
years has consistently supported the Democratic Party.   .   .   .   ine 
publisher of The Times   [Adolph S.   Ochs]   is a Democrat   .   .   .by 
conviction,   and so is   its editor-in-chief,  Mr.   [Charles R.] MillerM 
In the early stages  of the suffrage  fight,   the President was unwilling 
to formally endorse  the idea of women's suffrage;   thus,   the stance of 
61 
the New York Times.     The Woman's Party did not pledge support  to the 
war effort;   thus,   the stance of  the New York Times.     The paper's pro- 
Democratic bias was  probably further offended by the  tactics of the 
Woman's Party against  the Democrats,   resulting in vengeance as a 
further impetus  to anti-Woman's Party news  reports and  editorials in 
the New York Times. 
The Times often used a contrast with the more conservative NAWSA 
in  their news  stories  to imply criticism of  the Woman's Party.     In 
April of 1917,   the NAWSA received a full page special article in the 
Times Magazine Section after the National had pledged  its aid  to  the 
war effort.     Entitled:     "Suffragists's Machine Perfected in All States 
Under Mrs.   Catt's Rule,"  the article made no mention of  the Woman's 
Party.24    Division within the suffrage ranks was underscored with 
such headlines as "Rival Organizations,"25 "State Suffragists Condemn 
Picketing,"26 and "Dr.   Shaw Severe in Blaming Pickets—Endangered  the 
n9 7 
President and Carried Treasonable Banners, Says Suffrage Leader. 
To show criticism of the Woman's Party from fellow suffragists was 
a strong means of attack that the New York Times used often. 
When Wilson won the election of 1916 in spite of Woman's Party 
opposition, the New York Times made much of this failure.  The head- 
lines on November 12 read:  "Votes of Women and Bull Moose Elected 
Wilson-Woman's Party Failed Utterly." Proclaiming that the "Woman's 
Party terrorized the two conventions and frightened them with the 
prospect of four million votes, which it held over them as a club," 
the Times noted that "dispatches are unanimous in recording the 
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antagonisms  excited by the activities of  the Woman's Party."    The 
paper applauded  the fact  that  "deaf  to all appeals  to them as 
suffragists,   they   [women voters]  voted on the  issue of the day 
alone."28 
The nature of  the news  coverage of  the political strategy of 
the Woman's Party by the New York Times was significant, but even 
more  telling was  the editorial  comment that appeared  regularly. 
Typical  is  an  early  anti-Woman's  Party editorial.     "Suffrage  By 
Threat."    This June  1916 editorial  scolded the Woman's Party for 
demanding support   from politicians out of  fear of political reprisal. 
The Times called   the Woman's Party foolish but  reminded the readers 
that   it was 
.   .   .  unjust  to the majority of  the suffragists to regard  them 
as  responsible for the antics and dithyrambics of  the suffrage 
Extreme Left.   .   .   .   The efforts   .   .   .  would have about as much 
effect  on the election as  the evolutions of one Jersey mosquito 
on  the movements of  the satellites of Jupiter.29 
(An entertaining postscript  to  this editorial  is a letter to the 
editor  from Woman's Party member Elizabeth  S.  Rogers that was printed 
the next week.     She reminded  the Times that   "powerful and unexpected 
things  sometimes  result   from mosquito bites—especially the bite of 
the female,   you know."30)   A subsequent  editorial entitled "Millions of 
Goblin Votes"  claimed that  it was facetious  to say that women of di- 
verse backgrounds and with diverse influences  (such as husbands!) 
would vote as a unit.31    This line of argument was continued  in an 
editorial  later  that week,   "The Woman."    The editor pointed out  that 
'"the women'   and women suffragist  politicians are not one and the 
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same" and went on to say that in order to discuss "what the women 
voters will do this year, it might be well to keep in mind the 
fact that women are human"!32 
While the New York Times was undoubtedly the most persistent 
critic of the political strategy of the National Woman's Party during 
the years of the suffrage fight, the Washington Post during this same 
period also revealed in its reporting some animosity towards the 
National Woman's Party; however, there was less inclination on the 
part of the Post to levy editorial attacks. One can speculate that 
this "tempered hostility" towards the Woman's Party on the part of 
the Post was the result of hard times for the newspaper itself.  Wash- 
ington was one of the few major cities to add to its number of news- 
papers during the early twentieth century.33 The challenge of in- 
creased competition along with the responsibility of reporting on 
government to a city whose business was government might well have 
made the Washington Post hesitant to openly offend anyone. Thus, the 
apparently dominant attitude of distaste for the militants was adopted, 
but open editorial hostility was avoided for the time being. 
After the elections of 1916, the Post was less derisive than 
the Times had been, but the editorial on November 11 did point out 
weakness in the very notion of a woman's party.  The editorial opinion 
was presented in terms of common sense rather than in terms of opposi- 
tion to women's suffrage:  "The election returns show the futility of 
any proposal for a woman's party.  It is to the credit of the women 
that they did not vote as a sex, but as intelligent human beings."34 
The following day, the Post printed an "opposing view" in the form of 
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an interview with Alice Paul.    The headlines were:     "Women Voters 
Unite:     Suffrage Leaders See Great Gains For Their Cause."    Given 
a forum to state her case, Paul pointed  to the fact  that  "in the 
few months of  its  existence,"  the Woman's Party was able to deny 
"nearly half  of  the votes from going to President Wilson."    This 
triumph,   she believed,  would cause  the Woman's Party to become so 
strong that   "no party will desire to  incur its hostility."35 
Periodicals  as well as newspapers provided contemporary cover- 
age of the suffrage fight and of the Woman's Party in particular. 
One of  the most   important  such articles was written by Helen Ring 
Robinson,  United States Senator from Colorado for the  Independent  in 
1916.     Senator Robinson reflected that  the pleas of the NAWSA and  the 
Woman's Party  (or Congressional Union)  to the platform committees of 
the political parties would be of no  immediate political consequence 
but  that  the strategy was  sound.     She went on to say:     "Yet of the 
two organizations,   there  is little doubt that the Union was  the more 
instrumental  in securing the two planks with their high strategic 
value."    Though obviously sympathetic  to the cause, Robinson predicted 
that  the Woman's Party would not  take many votes away from the Demo- 
crats.     She went on  to point out   the obvious fallacy in the "party in 
power" scenario:     a two-thirds majority in Congress was needed to 
pass  the suffrage amendment.     "It   is unjust  to hold a majority party 
responsible for  the failure of such an amendment—unless  it  is a  two- 
thirds majority part."36    She was speaking less about  "justice," how- 
ever,   than about  political reality! 
. 
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Not all that was written about the Woman's Party was critical. 
A friendly and perceptive observer of the political strategy of  the 
Woman's Party was  the New Republic,whose editorial viewpoint had been 
cultivated by Mary and Charles Beard in  the early days of suffrage 
agitation in an effort to change  the critical stance the magazine had 
taken in 1914.3'    In a letter to Alice Paul,  Mary Beard wrote:     "The 
New Republic has been so hostile that Charles went down  to see the 
editors whom we know rather well and he explained and argued until 
they admitted  that   they had been blind and foolish.     Charles will have 
a reply in this next number."38    The resulting article,   "Woman Suf- 
frage and Strategy,"  appeared  in the December  12,   1914  issue.J* 
Thereafter,   the New Republic provided a counterpoint view to the 
constant criticism of  the New York Times through  its editorials and 
articles.     Charles A.   Beard wrote another major article on the Woman's 
Party in the July 29,   1916 New Republic.    He endorsed the strategy of 
the Woman's Party and said that  the "Congressional Union believes in 
nothing but  Realpolitick."    He defined the major achievements of the 
Party as:     bringing both houses of Congress to a vote on women's suf- 
frage in 1914,   calling the first national convention of women voters 
in September of  1915,   and the securing of endorsements of  the principle 
of women's  suffrage from the major political parties in  1916.    He con- 
cluded that  "fortified by the logic of  the events,  by political facts, 
by  the justice of the cause,   the Congressional Union will  continue to 
mobilize and fight until victory is won."40 
The editorial staff of  the New Republic gave a strong endorse- 
ment   to the "party  in power" principle on the week after the 1916 
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elections—a striking contrast to the editorial comments of the New 
York Times and the Washington Post of that week. The New Republic 
called on the NAWSA to adopt the strategy of the Woman's Party for 
the 1918 elections and suggested that "if the National Association 
does not see its way to harvest in this field, it should leave the 
field clear for the Congressional Union, and concentrate itself on 
state campaigns. . . . Its traditional policy no longer meets the 
advantages  of the present   situation."^1 
This  endorsement of Woman's Party strategy was  challenged the 
next week in a letter to  the editor which  combined perceptive  ob- 
servations with  probing questions about  the reality of the Party's 
tactics  in view of  the results of the election.     "Instead of in- 
flicting humiliating defeat upon the President," the writer pointed 
out,   "the women of the West voted  in unprecedented numbers and 
calmly re-elected him.   .   .   .  How do results of the recent  election 
justify your editorial advice to the National Association?"42    A 
thoughtful response to the  issues raised  in this letter appeared sub- 
sequently in an article,  entitled "Woman Suffrage and Party Politics," 
which gave credit   to the National Woman's Party for  facing and utiliz- 
ing political realities to their advantage.     The major political 
parties,   the article claimed,  would not act  on the federal women's 
suffrage amendment unless they could gain votes by doing so.    The 
writer admitted that  "the work of bullying should not go so  far as 
the Congressional Unionists propose," but defended the Woman's Party's 
...   aim to prevent  the party in power  from shirking responsi- 
bility.   ...  The  idea which gives birth  to  these tactics  is, 
we believe,   substantially correct.     The politicians will shirk 
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the suffrage  issue as  long as they can;  and when they cease to 
shirk it   they will do so either  in order to win votes or to 
avoid losing them.41 
This  exchange in the New Republic defined  the issues well.    The 
political strategy of  the National Woman's Party was  indeed exploi- 
tive of  the political system as  it existed.    The disagreement about 
this  strategy was rooted  in the question of whether women had the 
right  to use  the system or not. 
While the Woman's Party adamantly defended its right  to exploit 
the system as a necessary means  to its goal and the NAWSA expressed 
distress over the split   in the suffrage movement   that the Woman's 
Party's strategy was causing,   the real  issues were being aired in the 
public  press.     The basic question  that  pragmatic observers were 
raising was:     "Will   the Woman's Party's strategy work?"    The New York 
Times,   a strong Democratic voice that  supported President Wilson, 
scoffed at  the notion that  this strategy might work and did what  it 
could  in its articles and  its  editorials to discredit   the militants. 
Although  far  from objective,   the Washington Post was  less aggressive 
in  its hostility to  the strategy of the Woman's Party,   probably be- 
cause of   the competition for readers that  it   faced.    While the Post 
pointed  out   that women did not,   in fact,  vote as a group,   the paper 
allowed Alice Paul  to answer this criticism of  the Woman's Party's 
strategy.     The New Republic, won over to  the suffrage cause by the 
ardent  lobbying of Charles and Mary Beard,   presented a  positive view 
of  the Woman's Party.     It  gave credit  to the Woman's Party for  the 
gains made for suffrage and endorsed  the Woman's Party's strategy of 
working for a constitutional amendment by using the "party in power" 
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device as  the only realistic strategy for the future.     In the Inde- 
pendent,  Helen R.   Robinson,  a United States  Senator,  gave a middle- 
of-the-road view of Woman's Party's strategy that was probably  the 
most  balanced one offered in the contemporary press.     As Robinson 
pointed out,   although Alice Paul and her group had succeeded in re- 
viving the  issue of a constitutional amendment,   the Woman's  Party 
was not going to be able to muster a two-thirds majority in the 
United  States Congress while it  insisted on actively opposing the 
party   in power.     Thus,   predictions of success and  failure  for the 
Woman's Party's  strategy were as varied as their sources.     The 
methods  that   the Woman's Party chose intensified the debate. 
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CHAPTER VI 
IMAGE:     METHODS  OF THE WOMAN'S  PARTY 
To comment  on the methods used by the National Woman's Party 
necessarily opens  the whole Pandora's box of the debate on  the use 
of militant   tactics as an appropriate political method.    To compile 
a complete account   of all  that was said in criticism of and  in de- 
fense of the Woman's Party's pickets would be an enormous task: 
this study will not attempt such a cataloging.    But some attention 
must be paid  to  this aspect  of  the Woman's Party's activities,   for 
it was  the picketing that  created  the most strikingly divergent 
images. 
National Woman's Party Materials 
Both the Suffragist and Irwin's Story of the Woman's Party 
give detailed accounts of the Woman's Party's non-militant activi- 
ties such as  the intensive lobbying in Congress.     It is obvious 
from these Woman's Party sources that serious, behind the scenes 
labor was the basis of the Woman's Party's accomplishments.     But 
both sources give strong rationales for and extensive coverage  to 
the picketing. 
The origins of  the picketing are explained in a January 1917 
Suffragist.     President Wilson had refused  to discuss any progress 
towards woman's suffrage with the Woman's  Party delegation that 
appeared  to present  the  Inez Milholland Boissevain Memorial Resolu- 
tions.     Harriott  Stanton Blatch's reaction was an angry rationale 
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for a more militant   turn in the Party's political tactics:     "We 
can't organize bigger and more influential deputations.    We can't 
organize bigger processions.    We can't, women,  do anything more 
in that  line.     We have got to take a new departure.    We have got   to 
keep the question before him all the time."l      The White House pickets 
started   the next  day. 
A September 1917 editorial in the Suffragist explained  "Why We 
Keep Picketing"  in light of the current arrests of Woman's Party mem- 
bers.    The editors recalled that  the pickets were left alone for five 
months before the arrests began.     The pickets,   they said, were doing 
the same thing when they were arrested as they had been doing before 
the arrests began.     "There  is no law against holding a banner at  the 
gate  of the White House,"  the editors noted.     "The Government  is try- 
ing to intimidate those who ask for freedom.   ...   the very effort  of 
the Government  to suppress them is carrying their message all  the 
more clearly  to the people of the United States."2 
Anger at   the  "injustice" of the arrests of the pickets was 
evident   in subsequent articles.    The tone was one of disrespect for 
a government   that was denying the women their rights.    An October 
1917 story reported:     "Alice Paul is in jail.    The Administration 
tools have sentenced the leader and  inspiration of  the active wing 
of the American suffrage movement  to serve seven months,   on the 
charge of   'obstructing the traffic'  on Pennsylvania Avenue."3    With 
rhetoric such as this,   the Suffragist  continued to consistently down- 
play the violations of  the pickets and played up the harsh sentences 
and suffering endured by the imprisoned women. 
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Justification for their militant methods is best  exemplified 
in a Woman's  Party press release that stated:     "The popular mind  is 
a believing mind."    The Party contended  that   the press had made  the 
public believe that  the pickets were part of  the "lunatic fringe." 
The "real" militant movement began,   according to the Woman's Party, 
when women first asked  for the right to vote:     "Back in 1848 when 
a tiny group  led by  that  gentle Quaker,   Lucretia Mott,  got  together 
and drew up their   'Women's Bill of Rights,'  they did a militant  thing 
in the eyes of  their time."*    Thus,  although the Woman's Party did 
not ignore its militant methods,   there was a definite de-emphasis of 
militancy as  the distinctive feature of  the National Woman's Party. 
NAWSA Materials 
The NAWSA,   on the other hand,  gave the militant methods of  the 
Woman's Party much  indignant attention.    The History of Woman Suffrage 
notes  that when  the White House picketing began,   "almost every news- 
paper in the United States held  the entire suffrage movement  responsi- 
ble for  it."5    The action taken by the NAWSA in regards to  the picket- 
ing was  to disclaim any association with the Woman's Party through 
numerous   letters  to the editor and speeches,  many of which were re- 
printed  in  the Woman Citizen   (formerly the Woman's Journal).     In July of 
1917,  Carrie Chapman Catt wrote that "the absurd and unprofitable sen- 
sationalism of an extreme group of suffragists" was not representative 
of  the suffrage movement as a whole.6    Maud Wood Park wrote a  letter to 
members of  the House of Representatives to state the position of the 
NAWSA that  there was no connection between the National Association 
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and  "the small group of women in a different organization" who were 
picketing the White House.7    When the Woman's Party expanded  its 
methods to  include a  "watchfire"  in front of the White House,   the 
Woman Citizen was vehement   in  its denunciation and scoffed at  "child 
minds  tending bonfires."8 
The editorial board of the Woman Citizen warned of  the publicity 
that the Woman's Party was  getting through the arrest of   the pickets. 
The "blame"  for this was divided among the pickets,   the press  "that 
spreads the story  in that way most calculated  to make a prolonged sen- 
sation of it,   and   .   .   .   the public that  thrills humanly over its own 
shocks."9     In another editorial,  Alice Stone Blackwell,  while con- 
tinuing to voice disapproval of  the pickets,   expressed shocked  indig- 
nation over their treatment   in jail.     She also articulated an under- 
lying fear that  the added publicity would only bring aid to the pickets 
and  thus urged greater leniency on the part of the judicial system, 
so as not   to add  to  the "martyr"  image that was bringing sympathy to 
the Woman's Party.     She warned that   "the local judiciary authorities 
are playing directly into the hands of  the picketers.     Their object 
is to arouse sentiment  in the Western States against  the Democratic 
Party,  and  this is the way to help them do it."10 
The general attitude expressed by the National was summed up by 
Carrie Chapman Catt's observation that  the antagonism aroused by this 
militancy was directed wrongly at  the NAWSA because of a misconception 
that  all suffragist actions  "sprang from the parent  organization." 
According to Catt,   this antagonism caused many to oppose the  principle 
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of suffrage,   and,   thus,   the Woman's Party was destroying much  that 
the NAWSA had sought  to accomplish in the way of good will.11    In 
regards  to  the public press, Catt may have been overstating her 
case,   for it   seems that  the major press—especially the New York 
Times—did make a  careful distinction between the Woman's Party 
and  the NAWSA.     Editorials often took care to endorse the conserva- 
tive methods  of  the National Association while condemning those of 
the Woman's Party militants.    But much of the public never reads an 
editorial and,   in fact,  bases  its opinions on impressions gained by 
skimming the headlines,   so Catt's point was valid in that  the image 
of  the women's suffrage movement was hurt by the militant methods 
of  the Woman's  Party in the minds  of those who would not or did not 
have the information to make the distinction between the two factions. 
Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals 
The New York Times,   consistent with its general attacks on the 
Woman's Party,  was unrelenting in  its criticism of the Party's mili- 
tant  methods.     Its  editorials on the picketing were often chauvanistic 
and,   one would  guess,   infuriating to all suffragists—even though they 
were directed primarily at  the Woman's Party.    A burning editorial on 
January 11,   1917  condemned  the pickets as "Silent, Silly,  and Offen- 
...   no one can imagine the Socialists,  the Prohibitionists, 
or any other party conceiving of a performance at once so petty 
and monstrous.   ...  Why?    Because they are man, and men s minds 
may be wicked, virtuous, wise,  or foolish,  but   .   .   .  There is 
something in the masculine mind that would shrink from a  thing 
so compounded of pettiness and monstrosity.   .   .   .  Yet no one is 
astonished that women suffragists should propose such a  thing 
and  therein lies a matter of deep concern.   ... The granting of 
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suffrage would  intrude into governmental affairs a great body 
of voters   ...   to whom that  compound  of pettiness and monstros- 
ity seems natural and  proper.12 
The actions of  the pickets as reason to deny them the vote is echoed 
again and again  in the Times editorials.     In response to the jailing 
of Woman's  Party's pickets,   the editors said,   "To obstruct  the govern- 
ment   in preparing for war and in the conduct of war is evidence not 
of  fitness,   but  of unworthiness,   to have a share in directing  its 
policies."H    The Woman's Party received further special attention 
in a Times Magazine Section in September of 1917.    The article,   "Case 
Against Suffrage," involved  an interview with Mrs.  James W.  Wadsworth, Jr. 
President  of the National Association Opposed to Woman's Suffrage. 
She spoke derisively of  the  "nagging" methods used by the Woman's 
Party and said that the suffrage compaign had brought out the "un- 
lovely side of womanhood,   the side that  is hard,  bitter,   implacable, 
crafty."    She concluded with her declaration  (that was surely applauded 
by the Times editors)   that "government  is a man's job."14 
The militancy of the Woman's Party came in for further criticism 
from the New York Times  on the day after the suffrage amendment was de- 
feated   in Maine.     In an  editorial entitled "As Goes Maine,"the editors 
noted  that  the defeat was    "no fault of Mrs.  Catt,   or of the responsible 
suffragists,   the majority."    They expressed disgust with the Woman's 
Party's methods and   concluded  that  "when the Nation is fighting for 
its life.   .   .   .  Woman suffrage seems,  nay is,  but an impertinence and 
a  futility."15    The  editorial  the next day sought  to further discredit 
the Woman's Party and  its methods by linking it with leftist groups, 
sarcastically noting that   "there is enlightenment  in the activities 
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and strengths of the IWW in Idaho, Montana,  Oregon, Nevada,  Utah, 
and Washington,   States blessed with woman suffrage.    And Socialism 
is strong in those States."    The editors postulated further  links 
between women's  suffrage and socialism and closed with  the  tongue-in- 
cheek comment  that  "there is no end of enlightenment."lf> 
Criticism of  the  pickets and  the women in jail intensified 
with  time.     In August of  1918,   the Times editors became  increasingly 
harsh   in their judgment of  the pickets by saying that the women should 
have never been sent  to the workhouse because "they disturbed  the 
order and discipline of   the other lodgers."    A court was not  the 
place  for these women to be investigated,   suggested the Times:     "The 
place for them is  the clinic of the pathologist  or  the psychiatrist. 
.   .   .   Witchcraft,   tarantism,   suffrage obsession,  and its violent 
phenomena are proper subjects,   as  this humane age knows,   for psycho- 
therapy."17 
The first major news special on the methods of the Woman's 
Party appeared   in the New York Times in March of  1919 when the Times 
"discovered"  the card-file index which was the heart of the Woman's 
Party's   lobbying activities.     The use of  this systematic political 
tool diverted attention from the militant methods that had preoccupied 
the Times.     But  even this system seemed  to have sinister  implications 
as reporters  revealed  that at  the headquarters of the National Woman's 
Party at Washington was a card  index system "so extensive  in detail, 
political and personal,   that  22 different cards are required  for each 
Senator and Representative.   ...  No detail-in the words of an author!- 
tative statement—is overlooked." 
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The writers, with obvious skepticism,   reported that Woman's Party 
officials said  "that  the system included no improper tactics."1° 
The revelation of the Woman's Party's card index system was treated 
with predictable contempt on the paper's editorial  page,  where  the 
editors  "poked  fun" at  the systematic "sociological approach"  taken 
by the Woman's  Party.     Warning of "a  thorough card-index system that 
gives the feminists the moral,  mental,   social and political finger- 
prints of every Representative and Senator," the Times satirically 
assured the readers  "that a natural harmless,   feminine curiosity 
combined with the sociological and card-index habits of an enlightened 
age,  has  inspired  these collections so valuable to future students of 
twentieth century private life."!9    Even when it brought success,   the 
card-file received negative response from the New York Times.     The 
same day that  it was announced that the suffrage amendment had passed 
the House of Representatives  in 1919,  the Times editorial was  entitled 
"Triumph of   the  Index." The editors continued their tongue-in cheek 
praise of this  great   "sociological" tool:     "Doubtless,   in the interest 
of continuous and  comprehensive statistics,   the trays of  that elaborate 
index will be kept   full."10    The sarcasm of  the editors  implied  their 
discomfort with  these ruthless women's methods.     The New York Times' 
hostility to  this use of a card   file as a method of lobbying was proba- 
bly not  caused by general  distress over the idea of women lobbying,   for 
the Times had  often complimented the ladies of the NAWSA on their dig- 
nified and appropriate lobbying techniques.    The hostility to the 
Woman's Party's use of a card-file  index can not be explained by saying 
that  the women had  introduced a startling new tactic,   for this was a 
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tool used by many politicans and  lobbyists.     Indeed,   It was acceptable 
for women to lobby—If it was done discreetly and quietly—and   it was 
acceptable for a card-file index to be used—if  it was used by an ex- 
pert politician.     But apparently  it was not acceptable  to the editors 
of the New York Times—and others—for women to gain the political ex- 
pertise needed  to use such a method as a part of their lobbying 
technique. 
A second major article on the political methods of the Woman's 
Party appeared  in May of 1919.    This article went beyond description of 
the card-index system to describe the Woman's Party's Political Commit- 
tee and  the Organization and Legislative Committee.    This article was 
reasonably objective but described  the Woman's Party's activities  sus- 
piciously in terms of an efficient  "machine." An interview with Alice 
Paul  that was  a part  of the article is significant  in that  the line of 
questioning pursued the "sinister" implications of the "machine."    To 
the question,   "Have you considered  the political morality of bringing 
pressure on a member of Congress  to vote against his  real convictions?", 
Paul responded that  the Woman's Party was just  trying to organize the 
public opinion  that  a Congressman was obligated  to represent.     The Times 
countered with the accusation that:     "If the amendment  goes  through, you 
will  impose suffrage on some States where recent votes have shown they 
are opposed  to it."    Paul responded that  suffrage was indeed something 
women in every state wanted.     "We are proceeding according to the 
machinery of  the Government by constitutional amendment," she continued. 
"We are fighting a battle without a vote in the decision."21  It was a 
strong reply,  but necessarily defensive. 
The day after the suffrage amendment was signed,   the New York 
Times did reflect  some begruding admiration for the National Woman's 
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Party's political astuteness,   though the tone of derision persisted. 
The editor noted  that the NAWSA deservedly received  the pen with which 
the resolution was  signed  "in just   testimony of the   .   .   . habitual 
moderation of   the majority feminist organization."    Yet he called the 
National Woman's Party "bolder" and "more original" and reflected that 
"in the hands of determined women a full card  index of politicians  is 
mightier than a  pen or sword."22    It seems that only success brought 
legitimacy to  the Woman's Party  in the eyes of the Times,  and even 
their congratulations were laced with sarcasm. 
The Times  continued  to analyze the organization and methods of 
the Woman's Party as  it began the fight  for ratification in the states 
in  September of  1919.     "Suffrage Index of Good and Bad Governors- 
How the Card  System Which Forced Congress  Into Line Is Being Used  to 
Expedite Ratification by States" was the headline of an article which 
reported  that  "one governor told us privately  that he was sorry he 
had  taken a position  in the beginning against  calling a special ses- 
sion and wouldn't have done so if  he had known how much agitation was 
going  to follow."23 
It  seems that  it was  the militant methods and  then the astute 
use of  "men's" political  tools that were so offensive to the New York 
Times.     Tacit condoning of the NAWSA's methods kept  the Times from 
being a hard-core anti-suffragist  paper, but the editors had no room 
in their  scheme of  things  for a group of women who were  so improper 
as to manipulate  the political system with militant and  politically 
astute methods.     It was admissable,   it seems,   for women to participate 
in the political system.    But   it was deemed unladylike to manipulate 
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that  system successfully.     This was a direct threat to men's mastery 
of the political arena,   and  the New York Times rose to defend the 
status quo. 
The Washington Post began its coverage of  the National Woman's 
Party with  less hostility than that found in the New York Times.     But 
when the Woman's Party refused to pledge its support  to  the war effort 
in  1917,   the Post became more hostile.     One of the first  editorials 
reflecting this hostility made no direct reference to the Woman's 
Party and  its methods, but the criticism was definitely  there: 
The  injection of such side  issues as prohibition and woman suffrage 
into  the deliberations of Congress at  this time is a poor method 
of assisting the country in its collossal task of war.   ... At 
present,   the first duty of the United  States  is not  to bring about 
minor  improvements at home,  but  to win the war against  the German 
government.** 
The news article about  the arrests  of the pickets the next day was 
openly critical: 
Alice Paul's  suffragettes   .   .   .   think they are proving the fitness 
of women for the ballot by displaying their own contempt  for law 
and order.   ...  The suffragettes had succeeded  in forcing an 
unwilling police department to place them under arrest,   they had 
gained an enormous amount  of publicity,   and now the really big 
thing in  the career of a suffragist—prison bars and a hunger 
strike—was in prospect of consummation.25 
On June  30,   1917,  a news story in the Washington Post  declared the 
suffragettes  as a "War Menace" and attacked the picketing as an im- 
proper method  of protest.     The writer even suggested  that  "reports 
have been current  that   its activities are financed by German propa- 
gandists.   ...   The whole strength of their campaign at present  is 
devoted  to an attempt  to embarass the President."26 
Washington Post  editorials became increasingly hostile from that 
point  on.     Declaring "Militant Tactics a Failure," the editor asked. 
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"Do not  these women realize that  the farces enacted at  the White 
House by them are really detrimental  to the cause of suffrage?"27 
When wartime came and  the National Woman's Party did not officially 
leap  to the aid of the government,   it was only a matter of months 
before the editorial  pages of  the Washington Post and  the New York 
Times were hardly distinguishable.     It  seems that wartime patriotism 
allowed no condoning of protest,   especially on the editorial pages 
of  one of the capital city's  leading newspapers  that was facing fierce 
competition for  its readers. 
Even  the friendly New Republic gave some editorial criticism 
to the pickets as the passage of  the woman's suffrage amendment 
seemed  imminent.     "The strength of the women's claim on Congress 
does not   .   .   .  depend on their new voting power,"  the New Republic 
claimed.     "It depends greatly on the cool and restrained nature of 
the campaigns  that have succeeded."28    The New Republic, which had 
previously found  the political strategy of the Woman's    Party 
praiseworthy,   seemed  to find the militancy of the pickets at  this 
point   irresponsible and potentially dangerous to the women's suffrage 
amendment.     This was a widely held view in the media and it   is sig- 
nificant  that a friend,   like the New Republic,   found  this criticism 
to be creditable.     The timing of this editorial is significant   in 
that  it was written at   the height  of America's  involvement   in the war 
in Europe.     Christopher Lasch,   in his study of American intellectuals, 
has shown how the New Republic vacillated from an uneasy stance early 
in the European war of support for American non-intervention to a 
29 
vigorous stance of  support for intervention for the sake of democracy. 
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When America entered  the war,   the New Republic was by that   time a 
staunch supporter of administration war policy based on what Charles 
Forcey has   identified as "the nationalism of the new liberalism"— 
simply a commitment  to the war founded on the liberal's version of 
aggressive nationalism.30    This commitment  to the war explains  the 
New Republic's belated scolding to the Woman's Party for its methods 
of protest against   the Wilson administration.    The Woman's Party was 
protesting administration policies during wartime;   the New Republic 
was  supporting the administration's wartime policies;   so the New 
Republic criticized the Woman's Party's actions. 
Once again,   each different source's perspective on the methods 
adopted by the Woman's Party was significantly influenced by exter- 
nal factors—such as concern over the image of women's suffragists 
in general  or attitudes  toward wartime policy.    The conclusions  that 
can be drawn must  allow for some credibility from each source.     It 
is evident   that   the Woman's Party was an aggressive lobbying group 
that was organized  for efficiency and used sophisticated techniques 
to reach success.     It   is also  true that  the techniques used and the 
success attained by Woman's Party  lobbyists created an uneasiness be- 
cause these women seemed  "unladylike"  in their professionalism.    The 
distaste for such behavior was  indeed reinforced by the Woman's Party's 
militance in picketing and their behavior  in jail.    Although hostility 
toward  such behavior may have been temporarily generalized to  include 
other suffrage groups,   such activities were probably ultimately ad- 
vantageous  to the women's suffrage movement because of   the pressure 
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they  brought   to  "do  something about  these women"  and  about  women's 
suffrage.     So,   although  the methods of the Woman's Party were not  a 
pleasure  to watch,   their effectiveness must be considered a practical 
endorsement   for  their use. 
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CHAPTER VII 
IMAGES AND PERCEPTION:  "INAPPROPRIATE" 
RHETORIC, TACTICS, AND TOOLS 
The images, then, created by the National Woman's Party 
were disturbing in various degrees to both the less radical suf- 
fragists and to the public press.  Discomfort with and disapproval 
of Alice Paul's aggressiveness as a leader, the singlemindedness 
and vengeance of the Woman's Party's political strategy, and the 
militant methods of the Woman's Party are seen repeatedly in NAWSA 
reports and in the contemporary media. Woman's Party materials, 
on the other hand, seem to constantly be justifying the actions and 
attitudes of the Party. The questions that have arisen again and 
again throughout this study are: Why did the Woman's Party's acti- 
vities seem so inappropriate to the critics? What was it about the 
Woman's Party that so disturbed most observers? Part of the answer 
lies in the fact that the quest for the vote was threatening in and 
of itself to the accepted role of the American woman—and thus, to 
that of the American man. Women had never before been a force in 
political life and no one knew—though many claimed to know—what 
their influence would bring. Many men, defending the traditionally 
male status of the political arena, gave eloquent testimony to the 
fact that the dirty world of politics was not an appropriate sphere 
in which their idealized women should spend energies that could be 
better used in such "womanly" realms as the church and the home. 
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Richard Hofstadter,   in his  discussion of reformers of American poli- 
tics,   elaborated on this attitude as he pointed out  that most 
Americans of this time accepted  the notion that  "capacity for an 
effective role  in politics was practically a test of masculinity. 
.   .   .   [and  that]   so long as   [women]  stayed out of politics,   the 
realm of   ideals and purity belonged to them."1    Endless reference 
to an elusive  "ideal American woman" appeared throughout the dis- 
cussions about women and their possible  involvement  in poltics. 
One must  ask:     Exactly who,   or what, was this ideal woman? 
The image of the ideal American woman at the turn of  the 
century has been the topic of several scholarly studies.    Variously 
identified as  the "true woman," the Victorian woman,   the "ideal" 
woman,   and,   simply,   "the  lady," this  image was made up of such com- 
ponents as  innocence,   selflessness,   timidity,  highly emotional tem- 
perament,  moral  and religious  strength,   physical weakness and help- 
lessness,   and devotion to the home.    These various descriptions can 
be pulled  together and discussed efficiently within Barbara Welter's 
schema of  "the cult of  true womanhood."    The components of Welter's 
"true woman" are piety,   purity,   submissiveness,  and domesticity.2 
Although Welter developed  this  concept particularly in regards  to the 
period of  1820-1860,  her now classic  thesis provides the basis  for 
understanding the American woman into the twentieth century-and,   it 
could be argued,   even up to the present.     Subsequent works on  the 
images of women in nineteenth and  twentieth century America seem to 
be merely amplifications of Welter's definitive model of  the pious, 
pure,   submissive,  and domestic  "true woman."    It is  the images   inherent 
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in this model  that  should be explored and then viewed in terms of  the 
suffragists'   choices of  language,   tactics,  and  tools. 
The first component of  the "true woman" was piety,  or an obses- 
sion with religion.    Women were committed  to a continual struggle to 
"attain the perfection and submissiveness demanded of  them by God and 
man."^      A woman was expected not only to be religious herself but 
to be excessively religious and thus  to provide for the religious 
guidance of her family.     Purity as a virtue of the "true woman" was 
related to her piety,  but this quality also encompassed the  innocence, 
the helplessness,  and the protection from worldly affairs that the 
Victorian man thought was required for women.*    The "true woman" was 
a paragon of virtue who had no great educational or career-oriented 
aspirations and who would never  even think of  entering discussions 
about  the base world of politics.    She left  the world of political 
decision-making up to men, which was part of the submissiveness that 
is  the third aspect of Welter's model.     The submissive woman looked 
to her irate for guidance in all  important decisions and  consistently 
deferred to the  leadership of men.    This notion of submissiveness was 
one that was especially important   to the stability of many Victorian 
males who,   according to Peter G.  Filene,  found  that  the concept of 
"manliness" was suffering unsettling strain in terms of economic, 
family,   sexual,   and social changes  in the industrialized society of 
the early twentieth century.5    The "cult of domesticity" for their 
women provided a shelter from these changes for many men.     The virtue 
of domesticity was built on the other three aspects of  "true woman- 
hood,"  for  if a woman was pious,   pure, and submissive,  then surely her 
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appropriate duty in life was to devote herself to the home.    Filene 
describes  the cult of the "lady":     "Placed on a pedestal of piety 
and sensibility,  she governed  the domestic half of the middle class 
world while men did economic,   political,  and military battle beyond 
the doorstep."*'    Christopher Lasch amplifies this theme as he notes 
that American women "came to represent cohesion,  decency,   and self- 
restraint;   and  the cult of the home,   over which they presided,  be- 
came a national religion."7    The home,  then, provided the woman with 
her own domain in which  to be pious,   pure,   submissive,  and domestic. 
This,   it seemed  to most Victorian men,   should have been enough to 
compensate women for  the fact  that  they were denied participation in 
the male world of politics. 
But women were calling for the right  to participate in the politi- 
cal arena.     And since the major goal of  the NAWSA and other less mili- 
tant suffragists was  the same as  that of  the National Woman's Party, 
one must  return  to the question of:     Why did  these other suffragists 
not  provoke the vehement denunciations that the Woman's Party did? 
In fact,   all suffragists did receive some criticism based on the 
appropriateness of  their quest.     But what saved the NAWSA from the 
widespread disdain which the Woman's Party received? 
It  is quickly evident  that the NAWSA did exactly what  the National 
Woman's Party would not do:     they strove to appear to conform to an 
image consistent with the American man's  "ideal woman."    The NAWSA 
established a  claim on piety by drawing much support and being open 
in its ties to such groups as the Women's Christian Temperance Union. 
Dr.  Anna Howard Shaw,   one of the leaders of the NAWSA, was an ordained 
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minister as well as a doctor of medicine.8    The National Association 
laid   its  claim on purity in their rhetoric by calling for the vote 
for women as a means of bringing "morality,   compassion,  and peace 
into public affairs.   .   .   .   [The]  masculine brain they  [would]  supple- 
ment with feminine heart."9    The NAWSA showed remnants of submissive- 
ness  in condemning the Woman's Party's aggressive militance and by 
demanding "ladylike behavior" from its own lobbyists."*    Domesticity 
became what Filene calls a  "motif" of suffragist propaganda.    He 
quotes Maud Wood Park of  the NAWSA:     "We can say that much of our 
municipal and  state and national housekeeping is a good deal like 
the housekeeping of a bachelor who is trying to run a house without 
the help of  a woman."    Filene analyzes the NAWSA's manipulation of 
the "domesticity motif" as an effective answer to anti-suffragist 
feelings.H    This analysis  can be extended to the "piety motif," 
the "purity motif," and  the "submissiveness motif."    The language 
of these women emphasized the morality that women voters would bring 
to public affairs,   their tactics were always  ladylike and proper and 
tended toward such activities as tea time discussions with politicians, 
and the tools that they used were only as threatening as  the use of 
feminine persuasion.     In short,   the NAWSA claimed and accentuated the 
virtues of  the "true woman"  through its choices of rhetoric,   tactics. 
and   tools. 
The Woman's  Party,   on the other hand,  seemed  to antagonize those 
who valued  the  image of  the ideal American woman.    Each of the components 
of the "true woman" was challenged or offended  in some way by the lan- 
guage,   tactics,   and  tools of  the Woman's Party.     In regards to the piety 
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that  a "true woman" should embody,   the Woman's Party largely Ignored 
the theme of religion  In  Its rhetoric.     This absence of emphasis on 
religious concerns,   one would guess,  was one of the things about  the 
Woman's Party that  greatly disturbed early twentieth century observers. 
Woman's Party materials  often stressed Alice Paul's Quaker background- 
perhaps in hopes of using her religious background to mollify her crit- 
ics.     But beyond the erratic attention paid to Paul's Quakerism,   there 
is little in the activities of  the Woman's Party that gave or could 
have given  these women any claim to piety.     In fact,   their actions 
calling for expanded opportunities for women in politics were very im- 
pious  in the view of many of  their contemporaries.    According to what 
Anne Scott   calls "the mythology," God had created women to hold  sub- 
servient   positions  to  their husbands—in fact to all men.*2    Actively 
and aggressively seeking the vote certainly used tools and tactics 
and worked  towards goals  that were contrary to this scheme.     Thus,   not 
only was  the Woman's Party obviously an un-religious group;   its acti- 
vities could  even be construed  to be anti-religious! 
The notion of  purity,   the second component of Welter's  "true 
woman,"-especially the  implied  lack of political sophistication-was 
mocked by Woman's Party activities.     Leader Alice Paul had not only 
succeeded  in  the educational realm-having earned her Ph.D.;   she was 
even proficient   in the tools and tactics of politicians.     For women to 
be successful   in politics was especially shocking because that was 
considered  to be an exclusively male domain.    The prevailing opinion 
of  the age was  expressed  in 1887 by Senator Joseph Brown of Georgia 
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when he noted  that  "the male sex is infinitely better suited than 
the female" for the practice of politics and  that: 
While  the man is  contending with the sterner duties of life,   the 
whole  time of the noble,   affectionate and  true woman is required 
in the discharge of  the delicate and difficult duties assigned 
her in the family circle,   in her church relations and in   .   .   . 
society." 
It should come as no surprise then that  the New York Times seemed 
horrified that Alice Paul and her organization could carry their 
singleminded devotion to the goal of suffrage to the point of orga- 
nizing vengeful strategies and utilizing the threats and calculating 
methods that were so effective in the political arena. 
The nature of  the Woman's Party's quest for admittance to the 
process of  political decision-making was also threatening to  the 
notion of "submissiveness that   is such an  important part of  the  "true 
woman."    The militant and aggressive women of  the Woman's Party were 
anathema to  the image of a submissive woman who deferred to the leader- 
ship of men.     The women of the Woman's Party used threats  in their 
rhetoric-something that a submissive woman would never do.    And the 
defiant  tactics and  tools  that were part of  their methods made these 
women seem an abomination to those who cherished  submissiveness.     Those 
men who idealized a woman who  "was raised to please men,  not herself"  " 
were aghast at women who would burn the words of  the President  in order 
to show their disdain for him.    A submissive woman would certainly 
have never adopted the militant  tactics of the Woman's Party,   for sub- 
mission and militance are antithetical in theory and in practice. 
Thus,   the language,   the strategy,   and the methods of the Woman's 
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Party made a  farce of the notion of submissiveness that so many men 
cherished in the Victorian Era. 
The "cult  of domesticity" was also challenged by Woman's Party 
actions and  ideals.     The women of the Woman's Party openly and de- 
fiantly left  the domestic circle to lay claim to their rights  to 
participate in men's battles.     One can hardly imagine a more flagrant 
denial of  the cult of domesticity than the sights of women picketing, 
being arrested,   and being dragged  to jail.    These women were certainly 
not at home keeping house and tending the children!    The activities of 
the Women's Party created  the furor  that  they did largely because 
these women had  stepped outside the domestic circle and were manipu- 
lating the machinery of the political arena—a man's world. 
It seems  then that  the Woman's Party and its activities were 
consistently offensive to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century concept of  "true womanhood."    The rhetoric of the Woman's 
Party was  threatening,   its  tactics were aggressive and politically 
astute,  and  its methods were unladylike in their militance.    Add to 
this  the dilemma that Filene has identified for the American male of 
this time:     "How was a man to be manly in the twentieth century world?" 
Indeed,   the  concept of traditional manhood was undergoing a  crisis 
caused by the fact  that America was no longer a "pre-industrial,   pre- 
urban society" of  independent businessmen and yoeman farmers who 
valued rugged   individualism and a laissez-faire economy.    In other 
words,  men were having to cope with a society that had drifted away 
from the masculine ideals  for which their upbringing had prepared 
them."    The  insecurity that  this caused for American men could only 
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feed  the antagonism they felt  towards  the Woman's Party militants— 
who,   through their demands and  their actions,  presented a discomfort- 
ing challenge  to the concept of appropriate behavior for women. 
Clearly,   it was not simply the demand that a new dimension be 
added  to woman's role  that  frightened American men.     If  the impending 
identity crisis of American womanhood—and manhood—were the sole 
cause of the Woman's Party's  image,   these negative  feelings would 
have been transferred   to all suffragists.     This,   in fact,  did not 
happen,   as  the New York Times and others defended the actions of 
the "responsible ladies" of  the NAWSA.     So the riddle as  to why the 
Woman's  Party suffered  from the violently negative images that  it 
did when both  the Woman's Party and the less radical suffragists 
were striving for a reform that would alter the American woman's— 
and man's—role is answered by attention to the choices that each 
group made in regards  to rhetoric,   tactics,  and tools.    The Woman's 
Party made choices that were less acceptable to  the public's notion 
of what was expected of women than the  less radical suffragists did. 
But since most  scholars agree that  the role of women was changing in 
the early 1900's before women won the right  to vote,16 one must ask 
a final  question:     If  the role of the American woman was  indeed changing, 
why did  these women of   the Woman's Party create such a stir by adopting 
a model of womanhood  that was different  from the "old" model of the 
nineteenth century? 
The key word  in the above question is:     "changing."    It  is  true 
that  the role of American women was changing-but  the perceptions of 
• 
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of what women should be and do had not  changed.    For those—especially 
men—who were living through this period of shifting expectations for 
women    and men,   the tactics of the NAWSA were much "easier to swallow" 
than those of  the National Woman's Party.    The NAWSA chose tactics 
and tools  that   tried to bridge the gap between the images of the "true 
woman" of the nineteenth century and the newness of this  "New American 
Woman," while the Woman's Party adopted a radical change in role as 
an immediate role model rather than as something to aspire to.    Accep- 
tance of the Woman's Party required acceptance of a change that,   in 
conservative  eyes,  was only beginning—not one that was already 
accomplished. 
Therefore,   the degree of acceptance of this "New American Woman" 
on the part   of  the writer determines  the tone of  the "story that  is 
told of the National Woman's Party.    Woman's Party sources,  NAWSA 
materials,   and  contemporary periodicals can all agree on the fact  that 
the National Woman's Party,   formed   in 1916, worked exclusively for 
a national women's  suffrage amendment, which was finally passed by 
Congress  in 1919.     But beyond  that,   there are inconsistencies in the 
images portrayed.     This does not mean that  the author of one source 
was distorting the record while another was presenting Truth.    The 
honest  perceptions of  each  source are in conflict with each other be- 
cause they,   like all history,  are perceptions of reality based on assump- 
tions about society.     Keeping this  in mind allows each new source to 
add legitimate,   if conflicting,   input   to the story of  the National 
Woman's Party. 
> 
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NOTES 
^■Richard Hofstadter,  Anti-Intellectualism In American Life 
(New York:     Alfred A.   Knopf,   1963),   pp.   189-190. 
2Barbara Welter,   "The Cult of True Womanhood:     1800-1860," 
American Quarterly.     XVII,   Number 2,  Part 1  (Summer 1966),   pp. 
151-174. 
3Anne F.   Scott,   The Southern Lady:     From Pedestal to Politics 
1830-1930.     (Chicago:     University of Chicago Press,   1970),   p.  8. 
^David M.   Kennedy,   Birth Control in America:     The Career of 
Margaret  Sanger.     (New Haven:     Yale University Press,   1970),   p.   51. 
Peter G.   Filene,  Him/Her/Self:     Sex Roles  in Modern America 
rk:     New Amei 
Ibid.,   p.   7. 
(New Yor erican Library,   1974),  p.   69. 
6 
Lasch,   p.   65. 
8Aileen S.   Kraditor,  The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement 
1890-1920  (Garden City,   New York:    Anchor Press,   1971),   p.  8. 
9Filene,   p.   31. 
10Scott  and  Scott,  One Half  the People,   p.   33. 
UFilene,   p.   32. 
12Scott,   The Southern Lady,   p.   23. 
13 'ibid.,   p.   167. 
14 Kennedy,   p.   53. 
15 Filene,   pp.   76-77. 
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lf>Ibid.,   pp.   5-35.     In this chapter,   entitled "Women and  the 
World," Filene presents a great many indicators of women's changing 
role:     clothing styles,   rebelliousness,   educational patterns,  employ- 
ment patterns,   etc.     See also,  Kennedy, pp.   36-71.    This chapter,  en- 
titled "The Nineteenth Century Heritage," presents the "new woman" 
and the modern family as established  phenomena before the beginning 
of World War  I.     See also,   Scott and Scott,  One Half the People, 
pp.   27-28. 
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